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CHAPTER
The Duration of Benefits
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Murray Rubin
Consultant
Unemployment insurance (UI) benefits have two dimensions: the 
weekly benefit amount and the potential duration of benefits. How 
much is paid per week and for how long are the two questions upper 
most in the mind of an eligible UI claimant.
This chapter is concerned with issues involved in establishing both 
"regular" benefit duration and the duration of "extended" benefits. By 
"regular benefits," we mean the benefits provided by states during non- 
recessionary times. Regular state benefits are often referred to as the 
"first tier" of the UI system. By "extended benefits," we mean benefits 
that are paid in periods of high unemployment.
There have been two types of extended benefit programs in the 
United States. The first is the permanent standby Extended Benefit 
(EB) program enacted under the Federal-State Extended Unemploy 
ment Compensation Act of 1970. This program is supposed to activate 
automatically in a recession so as to provide extra weeks of unemploy 
ment benefits to workers who cannot find reemployment in hard times. 
The EB program is often referred to as the "second tier" of the UI sys 
tem. The second type of extended benefit program is the federal "emer 
gency" program. Congress has extended the duration of UI benefits on 
a temporary and discretionary basis during each of the last six reces 
sions in the belief that the benefit durations provided by the first and 
second tier programs were insufficient. The various emergency pro 
grams are often referred to as the "third tier" of the UI system. The fol-
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lowing two sections focus mainly on regular benefits, whereas the third 
section discusses the various extended benefit programs.
Three main questions arise in making policy on benefit duration. 
First, should benefits be offered to workers for a limited time or in per 
petuity, and if they are offered for a limited time, what is the correct 
limit? Second, should all eligible workers face the same potential dura 
tion of benefits, or should potential duration vary with the work history 
and earnings of a worker? Third, should the duration of benefits be 
extended when labor markets are slack, and if so, what should be the 
relationship between labor market conditions and the potential dura 
tion of benefits?
We treat these questions from both institutional and analytical per 
spectives. In the first section, which follows, we review actual prac 
tice—how states set regular benefit durations—and briefly discuss 
some of the implications of that practice. We also discuss the waiting 
period and other interstate differences in potential duration. In the sec 
ond section, we treat the adequacy and optimality of UI benefit dura 
tion, reviewing both the traditional institutional approach and modern 
analytical ways of examining duration adequacy. We discuss the histor 
ical and institutional reasons for existing practice in the states, empiri 
cal measures of duration adequacy such as the UI exhaustion rate and 
experience of UI exhaustees, the work disincentive effects of increas 
ing the potential duration of benefits, and analytical work on optimal 
UI. Our goal is to provide a framework in which existing practice can 
be evaluated. In the third section, we address the matter of extending 
benefits during economic downturns. Along with issues of UI eligibil 
ity and coverage (treated by Bassi and McMurrer in chapter 2), benefit 
extensions have been the most visible source of contention and debate 
in UI during the last twenty-five years. Benefit extensions raise again 
many of the issues discussed in the next two sections, and provide a 
test of whether research on the duration of benefits has been fruitful. 
The final section provides a summary and some provisional conclu 
sions.
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How States Determine the Potential Duration of Benefits
From the beginning of the UI program in the United States, the gen 
erally accepted goal has been to provide a limited number of weeks of 
benefits, payable only long enough to tide an unemployed worker and 
household over a temporary spell of unemployment. Consensus on the 
meaning of "temporary" has changed over time—from 15 weeks, 
which was the most common potential duration at the beginning of the 
program in 1935, to 26 weeks, which is the maximum in all but two 
states today.
The apparent consensus in the United States that 26 weeks is a rea 
sonable duration of benefits masks considerable variation among the 
states in how the duration of benefits is determined. Some states pro 
vide the same duration of benefits to all eligible claimants, whereas 
others vary benefit duration according to a claimant's past employment 
or wages. As a result, there are substantial differences among the states 
in the amount of prior work or wages required to qualify for different 
benefit durations. In the first part of this section, we review the various 
formulas used to compute benefit duration.
In addition, states differ in how long an unemployed individual must 
wait before receiving benefits. Originally, uncompensated waiting peri 
ods of two or more weeks were common. Currently, one week is 
required in most states and none in a few. Issues pertaining to the wait 
ing period are reviewed in the second part of this section.
Finally, a few states provide benefits beyond the regular duration 
under special circumstances, for example, when workers are dislocated 
by a plant closing or by general permanent shrinkage of an industry. 
Also, two states have a regular maximum duration of 30 weeks, rather 
than the otherwise universal 26 weeks. These interstate variations are 
reviewed briefly in the last part of this section.
Potential Duration Formulas
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the practices used by the states to 
determine the potential duration of benefits. As can be seen in the first 
two columns, nine states currently provide the same potential duration 
of benefits to all who meet the minimum qualifying requirement (that 
is, the minimum and maximum potential durations are the same).








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTES Parameter a is the maximum proportion of base-period earnings that can be paid in UI benefits during a given benefit year (see equation 3 in the
text).
Parameter b is the proportion of high-quarter earnings paid as the weekly benefit amount (see equation 4 in the text)
Parameter g = a/b and is an index of the state's potential duration generosity
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These are usually referred to as uniform duration states. The number of 
states providing uniform duration has fallen over the years, as 
Blaustein (1993, table 10.7, p. 304) has discussed.
The other forty-four states vary potential duration according to each 
claimant's past employment or earnings. These states use one of two 
methods to compute potential duration. In six states—Florida, Michi 
gan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—potential dura 
tion is an increasing function of the number of "credit weeks" worked 
in the base period (roughly, the year preceding the spell of unemploy 
ment), up to the maximum 26 weeks. A credit week is a week in which 
earnings equal or exceed some specified minimum, so that,
(1) DPOT = min {/(credit weeks), 26]
where DPOT denotes the potential duration of UI benefits and / is a 
function increasing in credit weeks. For example, in Ohio, a credit 
week is a week in which a worker earned at least 27.5 percent of the 
average weekly wage in the state. A worker qualifies for the minimum 
potential duration of 20 weeks of benefits by having 20 credit weeks in 
the base period. Then, the worker's potential benefit duration increases 
by 1 week for each additional credit week, up to the maximum of 26 
weeks.
In thirty-eight states, the potential duration of benefits depends on 
the ratio of a claimant's base-period earnings to high-quarter earnings, 
up to the maximum 26 weeks. If we let BPE denote base-period earn 
ings and HQE denote high-quarter earnings, then,
(2) DPOT = min (f(BPE/HQE), 26]
where / denotes a function increasing in BPE/HQE. Note that BPE/ 
HQE ranges from 1 for a worker whose entire base-period earnings 
were earned in a single quarter (BPE = HQE for such a worker) to 4 for 
a worker who had identical earnings in all four quarters (BPE = 
4[HQE]). The idea is that a worker with stable earnings throughout the 
base period will have a higher BPE/HQE and hence a higher potential 
duration of UI benefits.
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In five states, the relationship between BPEIHQE and potential 
duration is explicit. For example, in North Carolina, potential duration 
is simply 8.67 times BPEIHQE (up to 26 weeks), so that a Ul-eligible 
worker with BPEIHQE of 3 or greater is eligible for the maximum 
potential duration of 26 weeks of benefits.
In 33 states, however, the relationship between BPEIHQE and 
potential duration is masked by the formula used to calculate potential 
duration. In these states, potential duration is calculated as some frac 
tion, a, of base-period earnings divided by the weekly benefit amount 
(WBA), up to the maximum:
(3) DPOT = min [a(BPE)/WBA; 26].
The parameter a limits the total UI benefits paid to a worker in the ben 
efit year to some fraction of base-period earnings. In 18 states, a = 1/3, 
and, in the other 15 states, a ranges between .25 and .6. What needs to 
be noted is that in all of these states the weekly benefit amount is com 
puted, in turn, as a fraction, b, of high-quarter earnings (or, in some 
cases, average earnings in the two highest quarters of the base period) 
up to some maximum:
(4) WBA = min [b(HQE), WBAMAX].
Typically, b is 1/25 (.04), so that the weekly benefit amount equals one- 
half of average weekly earnings in the high quarter. (The parameter b 
ranges from 1/26 [.038] to 1/20 [.05] in these 33 states.) Substituting 
the WBA formula (4) into the potential duration function (3) yields
(5a) DPOT = a(BPE)/b(HQE), if WBA < WBAMAX 
or
(5b) DPOT = a(BPE)/WBAMAX, if WBA = WBAMAX.
It follows that for eligible claimants whose WBA is less than the state's 
maximum,
(6)DPOT = g(BPEIHQE)
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where
so the dependence of potential duration on BPE/HQE is clear for 
claimants whose WBA is below the maximum. For claimants whose 
WBA is at the maximum, potential duration will still depend on the 
relationship between base-period and high-quarter earnings. For exam 
ple, a worker who obtains the maximum WBA as a result of high earn 
ings in just one quarter may have potential duration below the 
maximum 26 (or 30) weeks, since that worker's base-period earnings 
will be low relative to his or her weekly benefit amount.
The parameter g can be usefully interpreted as an index of a state's 
duration generosity. Specifically, it gives the increase in the number of 
weeks of potential duration that result from a unit increase in BPEI 
HQE. In table 6.1, we have computed g for all 53 "states" (that is, UI 
jurisdictions). (For states that do not explicitly use the parameters a or 
b in computing the potential duration of benefits, we have calculated an 
implied g numerically.) Also in table 6.1, we have calculated the mini 
mum base-period earnings and high-quarter earnings that an eligible 
claimant would need in order to receive the state's maximum potential 
duration of benefits.
An examination of g and of the minimum earnings required for 
maximum potential duration in table 6. 1 shows that the variations in 
states' duration provisions are significant. Claimants with similar base- 
period work experience qualify for quite different potential durations 
depending on the state in which they reside, and the requirements for 
26 weeks of regular benefits vary dramatically among the states. For 
example, to qualify for 26 weeks of regular benefits requires as little as 
$130 in the base period (with $32.50 to $105 in the high quarter) in 
Hawaii to as much as $18,757 in the base period (with $4,800 in the 
high quarter) in Indiana.
Variable duration reflects the notion that individuals "earn" their 
right to benefits by working, and that each week of benefits is earned 
by a given number of weeks of employment or earnings. The wide 
spread use of variable duration also reflects two further concerns: first, 
that uniform duration is more expensive than variable duration, and 
second, that uniform duration can generate a high ratio of total benefits
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paid to base-period earnings, which could in turn lead to strong work 
disincentives. 1 We return to these issues in the discussion of extended 
benefits and again in the conclusion.
The Waiting Period
The waiting period has been debated since the beginning of the UI 
system in the United States. In all but a dozen states, a claimant must 
serve an uncompensated one-week period of unemployment before 
receiving benefits. At the beginning of the program, 31 of the state laws 
required a waiting period of two weeks, 17 required three weeks, and 
three required four weeks (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 200).
The waiting period was included in the early laws for reasons of 
both administration and financing. It allowed time for processing 
claims manually and for making determinations and contesting them 
before the end of the first compensable week. It also helped to conserve 
funds by avoiding compensation for short periods of unemployment. 
Over the years, however, experience showed that the waiting period 
was unnecessary for effective administration. Also, although a waiting 
period clearly increases fund solvency (other things being equal), the 
fact that several states have eliminated the waiting period shows that it 
is not essential for fund solvency.
Accordingly, some have argued that the waiting period should be 
eliminated entirely. The main argument for dropping the requirement is 
that it causes a delay in providing claimants with income in the early 
stages of their spell of insured unemployment. Since payment of a 
claimant's first benefit check usually occurs no earlier than three full 
weeks following the filing of the first claim, the existence of a waiting 
week means that the first check will represent compensation for only 
one week of unemployment. Eliminating the waiting week would not 
shorten the time it takes to deliver the first check, but that check would 
cover two weeks of unemployment instead of just one. This would be 
helpful if, as is often the case, a worker has delayed filing a claim until 
after being unemployed for some time.
Eliminating the waiting week requirement would be a relatively 
expensive step, however. In addition, an accumulating body of research 
and evidence suggests that it would be good public policy to extend the 
waiting period and to use the savings to finance a longer potential dura-
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tion of benefits. O'Leary's (forthcoming) findings, which are discussed 
below, suggest that short spells of unemployment are overcompensated 
by UI, whereas long spells are under-compensated. Jacobson, 
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) show clearly that dislo 
cated workers suffer large losses of firm- and occupation-specific 
human capital that no existing program—including UI—even begins to 
address. This research provides a rationale for extending the waiting 
period and providing a longer potential duration of benefits. 2
The number of states that impose a waiting week has been influ 
enced strongly by a 1980 federal amendment to the federal-state 
Extended Benefits (EB) law. That amendment was one of several 
intended to reduce UI program costs by providing incentives for states 
to reduce the generosity of their regular UI benefit provisions. 3 It elim 
inated the federal 50 percent matching share for the first week of EB in 
any state that has no waiting week for regular benefits. The amendment 
also applies to states that have a waiting week for which the individual 
is later reimbursed if still unemployed after a specified period, and to 
states that waive a waiting week requirement if it would interrupt a 
continuous spell of insured unemployment.
The prospect of losing the federal share of funding for the first week 
of EB motivated some states to restore a waiting week and deterred 
others from eliminating it. Before the federal change in 1980, there had 
been a trend toward removing the waiting week, which peaked at 
twelve states with no waiting week and nine states that paid it after a 
specified number of weeks of unemployment. By 1984, the number 
was down to nine and six states, respectively. However, mainly because 
the EB program has become ineffective in recent years, the number of 
states without waiting week provisions has risen to twelve, although 
the number of states paying for the waiting week retroactively is now 
down to four.
A few states provide two exceptions to the waiting week require 
ment. The first exception applies when a claimant is unemployed and 
receiving benefits at the end of a benefit year. If the period of unem 
ployment extends into the new benefit year, the individual may serve a 
waiting period for the new year either at the beginning or later in that 
new benefit year. The second exception allows claimants to serve a 
waiting period the week before beginning a new benefit year. This pro 
vision is advantageous to claimants who are unemployed for some time
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before they are able to begin a new benefit year; examples include 
claimants who exhaust benefits before the expiration of the first benefit 
year and remain unemployed or claimants who incur a second spell of 
unemployment before expiration of the first benefit year. 4
As mentioned, a few states convert the waiting week into a com- 
pensable week after a specified period of unemployment. Since most 
unemployment is short-term, these states frequently never pay for the 
first week. However, such provisions could create an incentive to 
remain unemployed long enough to be paid for that week. No state cur 
rently provides for payment of the waiting week to individuals who 
find suitable, stable employment within a minimum period, although 
such a provision could create an incentive for quick reemployment, 
along the lines of a reemployment bonus.
Other Interstate Variations
Increased Duration under Special Conditions
A few states extend regular benefit duration for workers whose 
unemployment resulted from structural change such as shifts in 
demand or changing technology. Structural change usually manifests 
itself in plant closings or in the permanent shrinkage of an entire indus 
try. Hence, these programs can be thought of as state-level dislocated 
worker extensions. 5
A Hawaii law separate from the regular UI law provides an addi 
tional 13 weeks of benefits to individuals unemployed when a natural or 
other disaster causes damage that results in widespread unemployment. 
Puerto Rico provides up to 32 weeks of extended benefits to individuals 
who are dislocated as a result of technological change, closure of a 
plant or industry, or the elimination or reduction of sugar cane crops. 6
In Iowa, potential benefit duration is normally computed as 1/3 of 
base-period earnings divided by the weekly benefit amount, up to a 
maximum of 26 weeks. However, for workers laid off because their 
employer went out of business, duration is computed as 1/2 of base- 
period earnings divided by the weekly benefit amount, up to a maxi 
mum of 39 weeks. In other words, the parameter a in table 6.1 
increases from 1/3 to 1/2 for dislocated workers. Minnesota provides 
up to 6 weeks of extended benefits to workers affected by a mass lay 
off—defined as a permanent work force reduction of at least 50 percent
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in a facility employing 100 or more workers—when the county unem 
ployment rate is at least 10 percent.
Other states also extend regular duration to dislocated workers but 
on a different basis. Massachusetts and Michigan have long provided 
additional weeks of benefits to claimants attending vocational retrain 
ing courses approved by the employment security agency. In both 
states, benefits may be extended up to 18 weeks.
State-level extensions such as these reflect a view that, at least for 
dislocated workers, regular benefits of 26 weeks are inadequate either 
to compensate a worker for permanent job loss and for the loss of firm- 
and occupation-specific human capital it implies, or to support a 
worker through a period of retraining that may be needed after perma 
nent job loss. Of course, the enactment of such state-level extensions 
requires both a political consensus and favorable fiscal conditions, and 
the existing state-level extensions fall short of the comprehensive com 
mitment to retraining advocated by some.
Maximum Duration
In 1979, twelve states paid more than 26 weeks of regular benefits. 
This represented the peak of a trend toward higher maximum durations 
that characterized the UI system in the United States into the 1970s. 
The trend was reversed in the 1980s, and, by 1989 (and still today), 
only two states (Massachusetts and Washington) provided regular ben 
efit duration maximums in excess of 26 weeks. As can be seen in table 
6.1, all other states have a maximum potential duration of regular ben 
efits of 26 weeks.
Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, there were several federal and 
other proposals to induce states to extend regular benefit duration 
beyond 26 weeks. In 1963 and 1965, for example, the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations proposed a program of Federal Unemploy 
ment Adjustment Benefits (FUAB), payable in both good and bad 
times to those with long and substantial employment experience (Mur 
ray 1974, pp. 30-32). Thirteen weeks of FUAB would have been made 
available to individuals unemployed more than 26 weeks, provided 
they had at least 26 weeks of work in the base period and 78 weeks of 
work in the base period and the preceding two years. In that it would 
have provided extended benefits to workers with strong employment 
histories, the FUAB proposal resembled the types of dislocated worker
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programs that have been discussed recently (see, for example, Jacob- 
son, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993a, chapter 7), but no action was taken 
by Congress on the proposal.
In 1972, a committee of the Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies (ICESA) recommended to ICESA's Executive Com 
mittee that the federal government give a 50 percent subsidy for any 
week of regular benefits beyond the 26th week (up to 39) that any state 
saw fit to provide, under whatever conditions the state considered nec 
essary (Murray 1974, pp. 25-26). ICESA took no action on the recom 
mendation.
In 1973, it was reported that the Nixon administration was consider 
ing a proposal to require all states to set a maximum duration of at least 
39 weeks (Murray 1974, pp. 26, 59). States would be reimbursed for 
50 percent of the cost of benefits in excess of 26 weeks. Proportion 
ately more work experience in the base period would be required for a 
claimant to qualify for benefits beyond 26 weeks: for example, 39 
weeks would require 50 percent more than was required for 26 weeks. 
However, no proposal was actually introduced to Congress.
Thus, various proposals to extend regular benefit duration have been 
put forward and rejected over the years. It seems highly unlikely that 
proposals to increase regular state benefit durations would fare well 
today. An approach that provided federal financing without federal 
control would be more in keeping with the philosophy of the Republi 
can Congress than an approach that dictated federal standards, but the 
budgetary implications of any such subsidy make it extremely unlikely.
The reluctance of states to extend benefits beyond 26 weeks has 
stemmed from at least three sources: first, the strains on state funds 
during the high unemployment of the mid-1970s and early 1980s; sec 
ond, the federal conditions adopted in the 1980s for state repayment of 
federal advances; and third, enactment in 1970 of the federal-state EB 
program.
Adoption of EB in 1970 is arguably the major reason for the decline 
in the number of states with regular benefit durations in excess of 26 
weeks. In brief, the EB program extends benefits in states where labor 
market conditions have deteriorated during the preceding one to two 
years. (We discuss EB in greater detail in the third section of this chap 
ter.) EB extends potential duration by one-half of a claimant's regular 
benefit duration, up to a maximum of 13 weeks. Hence, when EB is in
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effect in a state, claimants gain no advantage from the availability of 
regular benefits beyond 26 weeks: the maximum weeks of combined 
regular benefits and EB is 39. In other words, when EB is in effect, 
claimants are eligible for the same 39-week potential duration whether 
the duration of regular state benefits in their state is 26 weeks or 30 
weeks (or any other potential duration of regular benefits between 26 
and 39 weeks). Moreover, EB is funded half from state UI trust funds 
and half from federal UI trust funds. Accordingly, EB results in a 
smaller drain on state UI trust funds than do benefits in excess of 26 
weeks provided by a regular state program.
For the same reasons, adoption of EB is clearly the main reason for 
the decline in the number of states with their own extended benefit pro 
grams. In the mid-1970s, ten states had such programs, activated on the 
basis of particular state unemployment rates. By 1989, only three states 
(Alaska, California, and Connecticut) had such programs.
In sum, adoption of EB seems to have produced the acceptance of 
two ideas. The first is that unemployment beyond 26 weeks ceases to 
be solely a state responsibility. The second is that UI benefits should 
extend beyond 26 weeks only during periods of high unemployment.
Duration Adequacy and Optimality
The most obvious question in unemployment benefit duration is also 
the most difficult: What should be the potential duration of benefits? It 
is useful to think of the approaches to this question as either institution- 
alist or analytical, although the line between the two is not hard and 
fast. The institutionalist approach relies on historical observation, prag 
matic considerations, and informal examination of data to gain an 
impression of whether benefit durations are adequate. The analytical 
approach makes explicit use of economic reasoning and modeling. In 
the first two parts of this section, we discuss the institutionalist 
approaches to benefit duration, describing the historical rationale for 
the existence of limited potential duration, and reviewing the literature 
on UI exhaustion rates and the experience of exhaustees. In the last two 
parts, we look at existing analytical work on the disincentive effects of 
increases in potential duration on the optimal duration of benefits.
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We view the alternative approaches to duration adequacy as comple 
mentary rather than as competing ways of gaining insight into whether 
benefit durations are adequate. As will be seen, neither approach has 
progressed to the point where unequivocal or wholly convincing 
answers are supplied.
Historical Rationale for Limiting Potential Duration
Originally, financial concerns were the primary reason for limiting 
the duration of benefits. When the program began in 1935, actuaries 
argued that a 3 percent payroll tax could finance only 12 to 15 weeks of 
benefits. The actuaries' estimates were based on the unemployment 
experience of the 1930s, and, of course, such high rates of unemploy 
ment have not recurred. Indeed, actual payroll tax rates are now well 
below those originally contemplated (on average), yet the maximum 
benefit durations provided are now well above those originally contem 
plated.
In 1942, the Social Security Board acknowledged the importance of 
funding considerations in limiting benefit duration but also urged states 
to provide more weeks of benefits "unless fund conditions forbid." 7 In 
1950, the U.S. Department of Labor reaffirmed the concept of limited 
potential duration, but for reasons that went beyond cost consider 
ations. It concluded that potential duration should be limited mainly 
because UI is "short-term" insurance, intended to provide protection 
only to workers who are currently attached to the labor force and who 
are unemployed between jobs. UI is not intended for long-term unem 
ployed workers for whom job search assistance, retraining, or reloca 
tion would be more appropriate.
Having reaffirmed the commitment to limited potential duration, the 
Department defined the limits of potential duration with respect to pro 
gram goals:
Whether the unemployment insurance program achieves its major 
objective of covering the nondeferrable expenses of insured work 
ers during periods of involuntary unemployment without dimin 
ishing their savings appreciably or compelling them to draw on 
other community resources depends on the duration of payments 
as well as the amount of the weekly payments. To accomplish this 
purpose, the duration of benefits should be sufficient to enable the
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great majority of insured workers to find suitable work before 
exhausting their benefit rights, under normal or recession condi 
tions. In statistical terms, the benefit period should be long enough 
to ensure that no more than 25 percent of the beneficiaries exhaust 
benefits under recession or better conditions [emphasis added] 
(Manual of State Employment Security Legislation 1950, p. C-33).
By 1962, the Department of Labor's concept of limiting potential 
duration had translated into recommendations to the states: first, "that 
all eligible claimants be allowed a uniform potential duration of at least 
26 weeks of benefits," and second, "that, if a State considers that it 
must vary duration in relation to base-period employment or wages, 
the variable potential duration should range from a minimum of 20 
weeks to a maximum of at least 30 weeks" (Unemployment Insurance 
Legislative Policy 1962, p. 37). Thus, although federal adherence to 
the concept of limited duration remained constant over the years, the 
limit changed from 15 weeks in 1935 to double that in 1962. It is tell 
ing, perhaps, that there has been no comparable policy statement in the 
last 35 years.
Although duration maximums have increased over the years, there 
remains wide acceptance of the idea that the potential duration of ben 
efits should be limited. This view seems to stem in part from the belief 
that under reasonably good economic conditions workers should be 
able to find reemployment reasonably quickly, and in part from con 
cerns about moral hazard—that workers offered benefits of unlimited 
duration would extend their spells of unemployment to unacceptable 
lengths. Finite benefit extensions have been considered acceptable 
when labor markets are slack, but UI has been eschewed as a standing 
policy to assist long-term unemployed workers.
Two arguments have been made against extended benefits for long- 
term unemployed workers: first, such payments involve a drain on the 
trust fund, and second, they undermine the insurance character of the 
program (see Hansen and Byers 1990 for a cogent statement of the lat 
ter argument). The second of these arguments is important enough to 
deserve a brief restatement. When the UI system came into being in the 
United States, political considerations connected with financing the 
program dictated that it could cope only with brief spells of unemploy 
ment. Large industrial employers were induced to support UI legisla 
tion, with financing through an experience-rated payroll tax, by the
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promise that their workers on temporary layoff would receive benefits 
and hence would be available for recall when demand improved. It fol 
lowed that the program could insure only against short-term unemploy 
ment. Dislocated workers and other long-term unemployed were not 
the object of the UI system, so to finance programs for such workers— 
such as retraining and income support during retraining—out of the UI 
trust fund would undermine the finances of the program.
The irony is that the main problems of the Great Depression were 
permanent job loss and long-term demand-deficient unemployment, 
not short-term or temporary layoff unemployment. So it really cannot 
be argued that UI, by insuring mainly against short-term spells of 
unemployment, met the needs of the 1930s, except that it was better 
than no system at all. There is also an element of ad hominem argu 
ment here: once we define UI as a program that is intended to insure 
workers against short spells of unemployment, then, by definition, pro 
viding benefits for longer spells of unemployment undermines the 
"integrity" and insurance character of the program. Unemployment 
insurance was defined as a program for short-term unemployment out 
of financial and political expediency, not after consideration of 
whether permanent job loss or long-term unemployment are insurable 
risks that demand some form of social insurance. Arguments that UI is 
a program for short-term unemployment—and that it should keep 
doing what it already does—do tell us what the program is, but they 
beg the question of what the program ought to be.
Much criticism of the UI system during the early 1990s amounted to 
a criticism of the failure of UI to assist dislocated and long-term unem 
ployed workers. Indeed, the main change in the UI system that the 
Clinton administration has initiated—UI "profiling"—is intended to 
address this criticism and to assist workers who are likely to experience 
long spells of unemployment. The purpose of profiling (which is dis 
cussed further in the next section) is to speed reemployment of dislo 
cated workers given that the political climate is so unfavorable to 
offering extended benefits to such workers.
However, traditional defenders of the system believe that the recent 
criticism of UI is based on a misunderstanding of its purpose; that is, 
they argue that the system is intended only to alleviate the hardship of 
short-term unemployment, particularly due to temporary layoffs. 
Again, it is clear that the system would have been politically infeasible
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in the 1930s had it provided more generous or long-term benefits and 
that the system has evolved so as to deal best with short-term unem 
ployment. As the work discussed in the last part of this section sug 
gests, on the other hand, it is unclear whether relatively generous 
compensation of short-term unemployment, and virtual neglect of 
long-term unemployment, is socially optimal. In other words, the goals 
of the system have been defined largely by looking at what the system 
has done and done well, rather than by examining what type of social 
insurance system (financed by a payroll tax) would improve the well- 
being of risk averse workers. The aims, it seems, have been set by cir 
cular reasoning—this is what the system does well; therefore, this must 
be its goal—rather than by thinking through the problem of insuring 
against the risk of job loss.
Exhaustion Rates and the Experience ofExhaustees
Past research has addressed whether the potential duration of UI 
benefits is adequate mainly by examining UI exhaustion rates—that is, 
the proportion of UI claimants who use up their entire regular state 
benefit entitlement8—and the experience of UI exhaustees. This has 
proven a useful approach, in that it has exposed the characteristics of 
state UI systems that tend to yield high or low exhaustion rates. How 
ever, in part because it lacks a normative framework, it has not led to a 
consensus about the proper duration of benefits.
Unemployment Insurance Exhaustion Rates
Ready availability of data to calculate the UI exhaustion rate has 
made it the most commonly used gauge of duration adequacy. In 1962, 
the U.S. Department of Labor last expressed the objectives of regular 
benefit duration:
The program is intended to provide benefits for a sufficiently long 
period that, under reasonably normal business conditions and dur 
ing short periods of recession, a high proportion of claimants can 
continue to receive benefits until they are called back to work or 
find other work (Unemployment Insurance Legislative Policy 
1962, p. 35).
Although a "high proportion of claimants" has generally been consid 
ered as 75 percent (see the quote in the previous section from the Man-
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ual of State Employment Security Legislation), it has never been 
defined carefully. Moreover, the terms "reasonably normal" and "short 
periods of recession" are quite vague. For example, "reasonably nor 
mal" meant higher rates of unemployment between the mid-1970s and 
late-1980s, when it was widely agreed that the natural rate of unem 
ployment (that is, the rate of unemployment that is consistent with a 
constant rate of inflation) was higher than in earlier decades. In recom 
mending an increase in the unemployment rates that activate the EB 
program, the Department of Labor argued in 1981 that "Structural 
changes in the labor force have contributed to a generally higher level 
of normal unemployment" (Rubin 1983, p. 125).
Table 6.2 displays the annual UI exhaustion rate (for the regular 
state program) from 1940 through 1994, along with the number of 
claimants who exhausted their regular UI benefits. The table also 
shows the total unemployment rate (for 1940 through 1994) and the 
average duration of unemployment in the economy (for 1948 through 
1994).
Note that the regular exhaustion rate shown in table 6.2 is distinct 
from the total exhaustion rate, which is the proportion of UI claimants 
who use up both their regular state benefit entitlement and any 
extended benefits for which they qualify. The total exhaustion rate can 
never exceed the regular exhaustion rate and will be less than the regu 
lar exhaustion rate when an extended benefit program is in effect.
Not surprisingly, both the regular exhaustion rate and the number of 
exhaustees rise when aggregate economic conditions deteriorate—as 
reflected by increases in the unemployment rate and in unemployment 
duration. The main purpose of the extended benefit programs discussed 
in the following section has been to provide additional assistance to 
workers who exhaust their benefits under the regular UI program. 
Indeed, one of the main proposed goals of extended benefit programs 
has been to bring the total exhaustion rate (that is, the proportion of 
workers exhausting both regular and extended benefits) down roughly 
to the level of the regular exhaustion rate during nonrecessionary times 
(Might 1975; Corson and Nicholson 1982). For example, Corson and 
Nicholson have estimated that the emergency extended benefit pro 
gram that was implemented during the mid-1970s (Federal Supple 
mental Compensation) reduced the total exhaustion rate during the
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Table 6.2 Regular UI Exhaustion Rate, Number of Regular UI
Exhaustees, Total Unemployment Rate, and Unemployment 





















































































































































































































































































































SOURCE' Columns 1 and 2 from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook 394; 
columns 3 and 4 from Handbook of Labor Statistics, U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, August 1989, and Monthly Labor Review, various issues.
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1973-1975 recession to somewhat below the regular exhaustion rate 
during nonrecessionary times (Corson and Nicholson 1982, pp. 72-76).
In addition to cyclical ups and downs, however, there has been a sec 
ular rise in the regular exhaustion rate. For example, in 1994, which 
was not a recession year, 36.3 percent of UI claimants exhausted their 
regular benefits. This was only slightly below the exhaustion rates at 
the peak of the mid-1970s recession (37.8 percent) and of the early 
1980s recession (38.5 percent). The regular exhaustion rate during the 
recession of the early-1990s, 39.9 percent, was a post-World War II 
high.
The secular increase in the regular exhaustion rate can be attributed 
partly to reductions over time in the generosity of state duration provi 
sions and partly to the secular rise in unemployment spell durations. 
Although we do not explore these changes in detail here, some insight 
into the link between the generosity of state duration provisions and 
the exhaustion rate can be obtained from table 6.3, which displays the 
average potential duration of benefits (a proxy for duration generosity, 
in column 2) and the exhaustion rate (column 3) for each state in 1992. 
The most obvious point to note is that the nine states with uniform 
duration provide higher average potential duration than do any of the 
variable duration states.
The relationship between the generosity of state benefit formulas 
and the UI exhaustion rate can be seen more clearly in table 6.4, where 
we show the results of regressing the regular UI exhaustion rate on two 
variables: the average potential duration (which serves as a proxy for 
state duration generosity) and the total unemployment rate (as a proxy 
for labor market conditions). The data used in the regressions in table 
6.4 come from table 6.3. A literal interpretation of the results is that 
states with greater average potential duration of benefits have lower 
exhaustion rates, so that a one-week increase in the average potential 
duration is linked to a 1.8 percentage point drop in the regular exhaus 
tion rate. Also, states with higher total unemployment rates have higher 
regular exhaustion rates, so that a 1 percentage point rise in the unem 
ployment rate is linked to a 3 percentage point rise in the regular 
exhaustion rate.
Table 6.3 (column 4) also shows the percentage of exhaustees eligi 
ble for fewer than 26 weeks of benefits. This is an alternative measure 
of duration adequacy, which Murray (1974) explored in some detail.
Table 6.3 Unemployment Rate, Average Potential Duration of UI, Exhaustion Rate, and Percentage of Exhaustees 



















































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Column 1 from Employment and Earnings; columns 2 and 3 from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook 394; column 4 pro 
vided by Tom Stengel of Actuarial Services, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service.
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The percentage of exhaustees eligible for fewer than 26 weeks is zero 
in the uniform duration states and is below 5 percent in three additional 
states—Kentucky, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania. However, in thirty 
states, over half of all regular exhaustees were eligible for fewer than 
26 weeks of benefits, and in seven of these over three-quarters of all 
regular exhaustees were eligible for fewer than 26 weeks of benefits. 
Clearly, large proportions of regular UI exhaustees are eligible for 
fewer than the "standard" 26 weeks of benefits.
Table 6.4 Impacts of the Potential Duration of UI and the Unemployment 
Rate on the Exhaustion Rate and Percentage of Exhaustees 
Drawing Fewer Than 26 Weeks of Benefits, 1992
Dependent variable
Independent variable
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NOTES: OLS estimates using state-level data for 1992. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are 
displayed m table 6 3.
The link between the proportion of regular exhaustees eligible for 
fewer than 26 weeks of benefits and the generosity of state duration 
provisions can be seen more clearly in the last column of table 6.4, 
where we have regressed the proportion of exhaustees drawing fewer 
than 26 weeks on the average potential duration of benefits and the 
total unemployment rate, again using the state data in table 6.3. States 
with higher average potential duration of benefits have a lower percent 
age of regular exhaustees drawing fewer than 26 weeks; a one-week 
increase in average potential duration is linked to a nearly 11 percent 
age point drop in the percentage of regular exhaustees drawing fewer 
than 26 weeks, controlling for the unemployment rate. States with 
higher total unemployment rates have lower percentages of exhaustees
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drawing fewer than 26 weeks, which reflects the rise in long-term 
unemployment (and hence in 26-week exhaustees) that accompanies 
increases in the unemployment rate.
The regressions in table 6.4 illustrate the linkages between measures 
of regular UI exhaustion and both the generosity of duration provisions 
(represented by the average potential duration of benefits in a state) and 
labor market factors (represented by the unemployment rate). The 
average potential duration of benefits in a state plays a strong role in 
explaining both the regular exhaustion rate and the percentage of 
exhaustees who draw fewer than 26 weeks of benefits.
Based on this discussion, what are the pros and cons of using the 
regular exhaustion rate as a criterion of the adequacy of the potential 
duration of regular benefits? The main drawback of the regular exhaus 
tion rate is its dependence on both labor market conditions and state 
benefit duration formulas. This mutual dependence makes it difficult to 
determine what an appropriate target for the regular exhaustion rate 
should be. Although short-run changes in the exhaustion rate may 
serve as an indicator of increasing or decreasing duration adequacy, 
even these short-run changes may be contaminated by cyclical varia 
tions in the UI take-up rate.
Also, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, there is a link 
between weekly benefit amounts and the potential duration of benefits 
that implies a trade-off between the two. For example, two states that 
both limit total benefits to one-third of base-period earnings (that is, a 
= 0.33 in table 6.1) will have much different average potential dura 
tions—and hence exhaustion rates—if one provides low weekly benefit 
amounts (and hence longer potential durations) whereas the other pro 
vides high weekly benefit amounts (and hence shorter potential dura 
tions). The regular exhaustion rate does not take account of the trade 
off between the weekly benefit amount and the potential duration of 
benefits.
Finally, there is considerable empirical evidence that unemployment 
duration—and hence the exhaustion rate—can increase with increases 
in either the potential duration of benefits or in the generosity of 
weekly benefit amounts. However, if exhaustions rose due to greater 
UI generosity, we would clearly not want to interpret that increase as 
an indication that UI benefits had become less adequate.
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These drawbacks notwithstanding, the intuitive appeal of the 
exhaustion rate is so strong that it will undoubtedly continue to be a 
widely used indicator of duration adequacy. In particular, the secular 
increase in the exhaustion rate, which has occurred during a period 
when both weekly benefit amounts and potential durations were being 
reigned in, is a rather clear indicator that the potential duration of regu 
lar UI benefits has become less generous in the last 15 years.
Experience of Exhaustees
As already noted, the regular exhaustion rate itself may or may not 
provide a meaningful measure of whether benefits are of adequate 
duration. A high regular exhaustion rate could, of course, reflect diffi 
culty in gaining reemployment due to slack demand, but it could also 
reflect the disincentive effects of UI benefits on job search, among 
other things. The experience of UI exhaustees has been used to gain 
insight into which of these factors—supply or demand—is more 
important in generating exhaustions.
The length of time between benefit exhaustion and reemployment is 
a potentially useful gauge of the experience of UI exhaustees and dura 
tion adequacy. Table 6.5 summarizes what is known about the reem 
ployment experience of UI exhaustees, based on four studies that have 
been conducted since the mid-1960s. Only one of these studies, the 
Atlanta-Baltimore-Chicago-Seattle (or "four-city") study from the 
mid-1970s, was performed during a time when labor markets were 
slack (Nicholson and Corson 1976). The others were done during non- 
recessionary times (Burgess and Kingston 1979; Corson and Dynarski 
1990; Murray 1974).
In all four studies, one-half or more of the exhaustees remained job 
less 12 weeks after exhausting their benefits. However, the main infer 
ence to be drawn from these studies is that UI exhaustees are much less 
likely to find reemployment during recessionary times than during 
nonrecessionary times. That is, the percentages of workers reemployed 
at 4, 8, and 12 weeks are similar in the Pennsylvania, Arizona, and 
twenty-state studies but are much lower in the four-city study (the only 
study that drew a sample of claimants who exhausted their benefits 
during a recession).
Less is known about the experience of exhaustees more than 12 
weeks after benefit exhaustion. Only the Pennsylvania and twenty-state




























































































































SOURCE Pennsylvania data from Murray (1974, table 5); Atlanta-Baltimore-Chicago-Seattle data from Nicholson and Corson (1976, tables V8 and 
V.9), Arizona data from Burgess and Kingston (1979, table II.7), twenty-state data estimated from Corson and Dynarski (1990, figure III 6).
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studies give data on the status of longer-term exhaustees, and compar 
ing the two gives very different impressions of the percentage of 
exhaustees who remain jobless 6 months to one year after exhaustion. 
In each case, however, the percentage still jobless 6 months to one year 
after exhaustion is substantial.
The Pennsylvania study shows that there are variations in the reem- 
ployment experiences of exhaustees whose pre-exhaustion spells of 
unemployment were relatively short or long. Also, the four-city study 
shows differences in the reemployment experiences of white and non- 
white exhaustees and of men and women. The differences between 
white and nonwhite exhaustees are less pronounced than those 
between men and women.
Mainly because each has sampled a group of exhaustees at a single 
point in time, the studies leave unanswered whether UI exhaustees' 
difficulties in gaining reemployment are the result mainly of high 
unemployment, structural changes in the economy, inadequate regular 
benefit entitlement, or a combination of these. Further research, espe 
cially on how the experience of exhaustees changes over the business 
cycle, could be extremely useful. 9 Indeed, without such studies, the 
appropriate remedies for the reemployment problems of UI exhaust 
ees—or whether remedies are needed—will remain unclear.
One obvious approach, increasing the potential duration of benefits, 
is actually more difficult than it appears on the surface, even if there 
were agreement that it would be appropriate. There are two main ways 
of lengthening the potential duration of benefits. The first is to change 
the duration formula in a variable duration state so that more workers 
are eligible for 26 weeks of benefits. This can be done by increasing 
the parameter a in table 6.1 so that a higher fraction of base-period 
earnings can be recovered during a benefit year with a given weekly 
benefit amount. The second is to increase the maximum regular benefit 
duration beyond the usual 26-week limit. This approach presents sev 
eral issues: how far the maximum should extend beyond 26 weeks; 
whether benefits past 26 weeks should be available to all or only to 
those with substantial employment history; whether such benefits 
should be offered at all times, or only during a recession; whether the 
financing of benefits beyond 26 weeks should be a state, federal, or a 
shared responsibility; and how regular benefits beyond 26 weeks
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should interrelate with the permanent federal-state system of extended 
benefits. These issues are discussed further below.
The alternatives to increasing potential duration are retraining, relo 
cation, or other (less costly, usually administrative) assistance to 
improve reemployment prospects. Because retraining generally 
requires income support during the period of training, it is extremely 
costly. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Labor has opted for "pro 
filing," the attempt to identify workers who are likely to exhaust their 
benefits and to refer them to relatively inexpensive reemployment ser 
vices. Profiling with job search assistance can be viewed both as an 
effort to assist workers in gaining reemployment and (equally) as an 
effort to sort workers by their degree of commitment to gaining reem 
ployment. 10 For example, evidence from at least two studies suggests 
that requiring workers to obtain reemployment services as a condition 
of continued UI benefit receipt induces some to drop out of the labor 
force and others to find reemployment even before the required ser 
vices are provided (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985; Johnson and 
Klepinger 1991).
Profiling could change the character of exhaustees by weeding out 
those who are weakly attached to the labor force and by helping many 
of the rest to gain reemployment more quickly. Accordingly, profiling 
could change the nature of the problems faced by those who do exhaust 
their UI benefits. It follows that implementation of profiling will, if 
anything, increase the need for further research into the problems faced 
by exhaustees in gaining reemployment. Finally, for profiling to work, 
the demand for labor must be strong enough to absorb the workers who 
receive reemployment services. The need to discern whether exhaust 
ees' troubles in gaining reemployment stem from slack demand or 
other sources will remain.
Work Disincentives
UI has come to be viewed as a program of trade-offs and balances: 
worker versus employer interests, federal versus state authority, and 
benefit adequacy versus work disincentives. The program's goal of 
providing adequate benefits may collide with the objective of preserv 
ing work incentives if the benefits are so generous that they reduce 
workers' motivation to gain reemployment.
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The effect of UI on the duration of insured unemployment has been 
the subject of many studies in the last 25 years, although the impact of 
increasing weekly benefit amounts has been analyzed more often than 
has the impact of increasing the potential duration of benefits. Table 
6.6 provides a summary of selected studies that have examined the 
relationship between the potential duration of benefits and the duration 
of various measures of unemployment. The table indicates the data 
used in each study, the summary estimate (or range of estimates) of the 
impact of an additional week of potential duration of UI benefits on the 
duration of unemployment, and provides remarks on the estimating 
technique.
It is ctear that the estimates vary widely, from 0 in three cases to 0.9 
in one case. This range, taken literally, would suggest that a 13-week 
benefit extension could have no impact on the expected duration of 
unemployment of workers, or could increase the expected duration of 
unemployment by nearly 12 weeks (13 weeks times 0.9). From the 
viewpoint of policy, such a wide range is not especially helpful. What 
factors can account for this dispersion of estimates?
First, as is almost always true in economic research, the data avail 
able to study the impact of potential duration on the expected duration 
of unemployment have limitations. Most of the studies summarized in 
table 6.6 have used UI administrative records, which are an excellent 
source of data on benefits and the duration of insured unemployment 
but do not track workers beyond their spell of insured unemployment. 
As a result, observed spells of unemployment are censored at the 
potential duration of benefits.
There are econometric methods for dealing with such data, although 
none is wholly satisfactory. A full treatment of these techniques and 
their various strengths and weaknesses is beyond the scope of this dis 
cussion, but it seems that studies that use UI exit rate models obtain 
lower estimates of the impact of increases in the potential duration of 
benefits than do studies that use maximum likelihood (including Tobit) 
duration models. 11 Given that the UI exit rate models impose less oner 
ous distributional assumptions, they should probably be given greater 
weight than the other estimation methods. 12
Second, the relationship between potential duration and the proba 
bility of reemployment (and hence the duration of unemployment) may 
vary with the tightness of the labor market. Even if an additional week
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Table 6.6 Selected Estimates of the Impact of Increased Potential 
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of benefits had the same effect on the intensity of a worker's job search 
regardless of the state of the labor market, that given change in search 
intensity would translate into a different reemployment probability 
depending on the availability of job offers. There have been few 
attempts to estimate how the impact of an additional week of potential 
duration varies with labor market conditions (but see Wandner 1975). 
There is a real need for further investigation of this issue.
Third, some studies have focused on the impact of increasing the 
potential duration of regular benefits, others have focused on the 
impact of EB, and still others have focused on the impacts of emer 
gency extensions such as Federal Supplemental Benefits and Federal 
Supplemental Compensation. There is some evidence that the impacts 
of EB and emergency extensions are greater than the impacts of 
increasing the potential duration of regular benefits, but further work 
sorting out the various impacts and the reasons for them would clearly 
be useful.
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Finally, there may simply be greater variation in the behavior of 
workers than economists are accustomed to considering. This is sug 
gested, for example, by results derived from the reemployment bonus 
experiments, all of which were similarly designed, implemented, and 
monitored, but which nevertheless yielded results that varied over a 
substantial range (Davidson and Woodbury 1996).
If we eliminate the estimates that are obtained using duration mod 
els, then we significantly reduce the variation in the estimates. The 
exceptions are Grossman's study (1989), which differs from the others 
because it examines the impact of increasing the potential duration of 
benefits of workers who have already exhausted regular benefits, and 
Ham and Rea's study (1987) of the Canadian UI system, which differs 
in a variety of ways from the U.S. system. With these exceptions, all of 
the UI exit rate estimates are in the range of 0.1 to 0.2. Similarly, Mof- 
fitt and Nicholson (1982) obtain an estimate of 0.1 week, and translat 
ing the reemployment bonus impacts using an equilibrium search 
model yields estimates in the range of 0 to 0.2 (Davidson and Wood- 
bury 1996). On the whole, then, the evidence suggests that increasing 
the potential duration of UI benefits by one week increases the 
expected duration of unemployment by one day (0.2 week) or less.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Efforts to use economic and econometric methods to gauge the opti 
mal duration of UI benefits are relatively few and recent. Although the 
studies reviewed in this section have yet to point unambiguously 
toward conclusions about the optimal duration of benefits, the 
approach holds out hope of generating recommendations that are based 
on clearly articulated assumptions and observed behavior. Since bene 
fit adequacy is reviewed in chapter 5, we focus on recent analyses that 
bear closely on the potential duration of benefits.
O'Leary's work on benefit adequacy (forthcoming) uses consumer 
theory informed by econometric estimates of the trade-off between 
income and leisure and concludes that short spells of unemployment 
are overcompensated by UI, whereas long spells are undercompen 
sated. O'Leary's result stems from the assumption that the marginal 
utility of leisure diminishes. That is, an additional week of leisure (in 
the form of unemployment) has a far higher value to someone who
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works 50 weeks in a year (and has just 2 weeks of leisure) than to 
someone who works only 26 weeks in a year (and has 26 weeks of lei 
sure). It follows that a much smaller weekly benefit amount is needed 
to compensate a worker for the first few weeks of unemployment 
(since the leisure implied by those first weeks is itself more valuable) 
than is needed to compensate a worker for later weeks of unemploy 
ment. However, since the weekly benefit amount is generally constant 
over the spell of insured unemployment, early weeks of unemployment 
(and short spells) are more fully compensated than are later weeks (and 
long spells).
Although the logic of O'Leary's findings is clear, the implications 
for policy are somewhat less so. Whenever there is moral hazard, as 
with UI, full compensation for the occurrence of a risky event is unde 
sirable, since it raises the probability of the event (or its continuation). 
If the disincentive effect (that is, reduced job search intensity) of an 
additional week of potential benefits increases with the length of a 
spell of unemployment, then raising the weekly benefit amount as a 
spell of unemployment lengthens might be unattractive. The implica 
tions of raising the weekly benefit amount as a spell lengthens would 
need to be examined in a model that takes account of both the benefits 
and costs of doing so. An alternative way of correcting the overcom- 
pensation of short spells would be to extend the waiting period. This 
has the additional attraction of freeing funds that could be used to 
finance benefits beyond the usual limit of 26 weeks, in order to correct 
the undercompensation of long-term unemployed workers. Again, 
however, the implications of doing so need to be explored in a model 
that takes account of the response of unemployed workers to the pro 
posed change in the pattern of unemployment compensation.
Gruber (forthcoming) has pointed out that appraising benefit ade 
quacy by comparing UI benefits with pre-unemployment income is 
appropriate only if workers have no access to other sources of income, 
such as savings, loans, or the labor supply of other household mem 
bers. If alternative income sources exist, then UI may substitute for the 
other ways of financing a spell of unemployment, crowd them out, and 
have no real effect on consumption. This insight highlights the impor 
tance of examining whether UI actually smoothes consumption, that is, 
whether unemployed workers who are eligible for more generous UI
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benefits experience smaller drops in consumption than do workers who 
are eligible for less generous UI benefits.
Gruber obtains conflicting results on whether UI smoothes con 
sumption. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, he 
finds quite strong evidence of consumption smoothing, whereas using 
data from the Survey of Consumer Expenditures, he finds far weaker 
evidence of smoothing. The latter result suggests that UI does crowd 
out other ways of financing a spell of unemployment, whereas the 
former result suggests that it does not. Until this empirical issue is 
resolved, it will be important to examine whether findings about bene 
fit adequacy and optimal UI programs are sensitive to assumptions 
about the ability of workers to save and borrow, and the willingness of 
other members of the household to work more when the principal 
earner is unemployed.
We turn next to work on optimal UI that takes an equilibrium 
approach and incorporates both the benefits and costs (including those 
resulting from induced changes in behavior) of the UI system. There 
was a flurry of interest in this approach in the late 1970s—the contribu 
tions of Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) are considered the classic 
treatments—although its complexity seems to have stalled further 
development. From our perspective, it is especially important that both 
Baily and Flemming assumed the potential duration of UI benefits to 
be infinite and derived an optimal replacement rate based on that 
assumption. Clearly, this assumes away the problem with which we are 
most concerned: the optimal potential duration of benefits.
Recently, Davidson and Woodbury (forthcoming) have extended the 
work of Baily and Flemming to examine the optimal potential duration 
of UI. 13 Surprisingly, they find that the optimal UI program is charac 
terized by an infinite potential duration of benefits. The argument is as 
follows. Let WBA denote the weekly benefit amount and let T denote 
the potential duration of benefits. Suppose that we compare two UI 
programs (WBA^T^ and (WBA2,T2) with WBA l > WBA2 and T{ < T2 so 
that the second program offers lower benefits but a longer potential 
duration of benefits. Suppose further that these two programs cost the 
same amount to fund so that employed workers earn the same after-tax 
wage under the two programs. Then it can be shown that all risk-averse 
workers prefer the second program even though weekly benefit 
amounts are lower. The second program is preferred because the
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reduced probability that workers will exhaust their benefits more than 
offsets the reduction in weekly benefits. In the terminology of decision 
making under uncertainty, the second program is "less risky" than the 
first program and is therefore preferred by all risk-averse agents. Alter 
natively, to use the terminology that Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
introduced in their classic paper on increasing risk, the second UI pro 
gram, with longer potential duration and lower benefit amount, is a 
"mean-preserving spread," which reduces the risk associated with 
unemployment. Since the optimal UI program offers benefits indefi 
nitely, while most states offer benefits for only 26 weeks, the model's 
results suggest that the potential durations in the U.S. system may not 
be generous enough.
Three remarks on this potentially controversial result need to be 
made. First, a likely objection to the finding that an infinite potential 
duration of benefits is optimal is that, if benefits were inexhaustible, 
workers would never return to work. It is true that lengthening the 
potential duration of benefits would lead workers to remain unem 
ployed longer and to a higher unemployment rate. Davidson and 
Woodbury (forthcoming) show that increasing the potential duration of 
UI benefits from 6 months to an unlimited period with a UI replace 
ment rate of 0.5 would raise the unemployment rate from 7 percent to 
10 percent. However, this is not a shut down of the economy: workers 
would not collect UI benefits paying a replacement rate of 0.5 (or 0.75) 
forever. Also, the increase in the unemployment rate would result from 
voluntary behavior, not from economic hard times, and would connote 
an improvement in workers' well-being.
A second, more serious, objection is that extending benefits and 
lowering the benefit amount reduce the aggregate search effort of 
unemployed workers, which in turn could reduce employment. Lower 
employment would mean reduced tax revenues, so that the total 
amount paid to the unemployed would drop. If this occurred, the costs 
of the new program could outweigh its benefits (which stem mainly 
from reduced risk). It turns out, however, that this chain of events 
would not take place. The reason is that the reduction in aggregate 
search effort is almost fully offset by a change in the distribution of 
search effort across the spell of unemployment. That is, with a longer 
potential duration of benefits, search effort becomes more evenly dis 
tributed across the spell of unemployment, and this increases equilib-
250 The Duration of Benefits
rium employment. Davidson and Woodbury provide a simulation 
showing the net effects of the change in aggregate search effort and the 
change in the distribution of search effort: as the potential duration of 
UI benefits rises, unemployment rises by such a small amount that any 
loss in tax revenue is dominated by society's savings in aggregate 
search costs (the benefit of reduced aggregate search effort). Hence, 
changes in search effort do not erase the result that the optimal poten 
tial duration of benefits is infinite.
A third possible objection is that Davidson and Woodbury assume 
Ul-eligible workers to be homogeneous; it is unclear whether the result 
that the optimal potential duration of benefits is unlimited is sensitive 
to this assumption. In future work, it will be important to consider that 
some Ul-eligible workers may be weakly attached to the labor force, 
that some workers have a high probability of layoff with a low 
expected duration of unemployment (as do many blue-collar produc 
tion workers), and that others face a low probability of layoff with a 
longer expected duration of unemployment (for example, white-collar 
nonproduction workers). It is an open question whether an unlimited 
potential duration of benefits would remain optimal in a model that 
accounts for these various types of workers.
Extended Benefit Programs
When unemployment rates rise in the wake of a recession, spells of 
unemployment tend to lengthen and more workers exhaust their UI 
benefits, that is, more workers experience spells of unemployment that 
exceed their potential duration of UI benefits. Whether these length 
ened spells of unemployment occur because job separation rates rise or 
because reemployment rates fall is unimportant. As long as the length 
ened spells result from slack demand and employer behavior (rather 
than from voluntary worker behavior), there is a justification for 
increasing the potential duration of UI benefits.
On six different occasions, beginning in 1958, Congress has reacted 
to slack labor markets by providing a limited number of weeks of fed 
erally financed "extended" benefits to workers who had exhausted their 
regular state benefits. In addition to these six temporary or discretion-
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ary programs, Congress in 1970 established a permanent or "standby" 
extended benefits program (under the Extended Unemployment Com 
pensation Act), which in principle is activated automatically by condi 
tions of high unemployment. The following discussion provides a brief 
history of the six temporary programs and of the standby extended 
benefits program. 14 We also discuss the three most controversial issues 
surrounding extended benefits: how these benefits should be activated, 
whether additional qualifying and eligibility conditions should be 
required, and how such benefits should be financed. Finally, we recom 
mend two changes in extended benefit policy based on the evidence 
and discussion.
Federal Extended Benefit Programs: A Brief History
Currently, the maximum potential duration of unemployment bene 
fits provided by regular state programs ("first-tier" programs) is 26 
weeks in all states except Massachusetts and Washington, where the 
maximum potential duration is 30 weeks (see table 6.1 and the accom 
panying text). In ten states, the potential duration of benefits is 26 
weeks for all claimants who qualify for any benefits (Illinois and New 
York are the only large states that provide such "uniform potential 
duration" of benefits). In every other state, the potential duration of 
benefits varies with a claimant's work experience in the base period, 
roughly the year preceding the claim for benefits (again, see the first 
section of this chapter).
Table 6.7 provides a summary of the main features of the six federal 
programs that have temporarily extended the potential duration of 
unemployment benefits beyond the duration provided by state pro 
grams. The permanent standby Extended Benefit program (EB) is also 
summarized in the table. The standby EB program has come to be 
called the "second tier" of the UI system, and temporary emergency 
extensions have come to be called the "third tier" of the system.
The first two federal temporary benefit extensions, Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation (TUC) and Temporary Extended 
Unemployment Compensation (TEUC), were enacted in 1958 and 
1961. They were similar in that each lasted slightly over a year and 
extended the potential duration of benefits to workers who exhausted 
their regular state benefits by 50 percent, up to a maximum of 13 extra
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weeks. They differed, however, in that TUC was a voluntary program 
financed by interest-free loans to 17 participating states. TEUC, on the 
other hand, was mandatory and was financed through increases in the 
federal unemployment tax.
If one accepts the need for extending benefits in a recession, then 
relying on temporary emergency extensions such as TUC and TEUC is 
clearly suboptimal. Temporary extensions are discretionary rather than 
triggered automatically. It takes time for Congress to recognize the 
onset of a recession and to enact legislation in response, so there may 
be a significant lag between the onset of slack labor markets and the 
availability of extended benefits. Also, temporary extensions have 
proven politically difficult to shut down, as we show below, so they are 
both slow to turn on and slow to turn off. Finally, temporary emergency 
extensions have usually been made effective on the date of enactment, 
leaving UI administrators little or no time to implement the new pro 
gram.
In recognition of these problems with temporary extensions, in 1965 
and 1966 Congress considered a proposal to create a permanent (or 
"standby") extended benefits program. The proposal was modeled on 
earlier temporary programs, in that it extended the potential duration of 
benefits by 50 percent, up to 13 weeks, for workers who exhausted 
their regular state benefits. However, the extended benefits would have 
been "triggered" automatically in a recession (rather than requiring 
congressional discretion and action) and would have been financed 
half-and-half by the states and the federal government. (Recall that 
regular UI benefits are financed out of state UI trust funds, whereas 
TEUC and most subsequent emergency extended benefits have been 
financed out of the federal UI trust fund.)
Although the proposal for a permanent standby extended benefits 
program failed in 1966, Congress enacted essentially the same pro 
posal in 1970 as the Extended Unemployment Compensation Act, gen 
erally known as the Extended Benefits program, or EB. The intent of 
the permanent "standby" EB program was and is to extend automati 
cally the potential duration of benefits when the economy slumps into 
recession, rather than to rely on a reaction from Congress. EB extends 
benefits to claimants who exhaust their regular state benefits by an 
amount equal to one-half of their regular benefit duration, up to 13 
weeks. The weekly benefit amount is the same as the weekly benefit
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amount under the regular state program. Originally, EB was activated 
nationally whenever the national insured unemployment rate (IUR) 
averaged at least 4 percent for 13 weeks. Also, it was activated in a 
given state whenever the state's IUR averaged at least 4 percent for 13 
weeks and was 20 percent above the state IUR of the corresponding 
13-week period in either of the two previous years. The EB program is 
financed half-and-half from the federal and state UI trust funds. In the 
next part of this section, we discuss the activation (or "triggering") of 
EB, special qualifying and eligibility requirements, and financing.
States were allowed to adopt EB as early as October 1970 and were 
required to do so no later than January 1972. Even before EB became 
available in all states, however, Congress enacted the third temporary 
extension under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act 
(sometimes called "Temporary Compensation" or "TC"), which pro 
vided up to 13 weeks of extended benefits to claimants who either 
exhausted EB or exhausted regular benefits in states where EB was not 
available. Temporary Compensation was activated by special triggers 
that differed from the standby EB triggers. It was financed from Fed 
eral Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) revenues. The program, which 
originally was set to run from January 1972 until September 1972, was 
extended through March 1973.
During the severe recession of the mid-1970s, the national trigger 
activated EB in all states, permitting workers to receive up to 26 weeks 
of regular unemployment benefits followed by up to 13 weeks of EB. 
Nevertheless, the recession was so severe that Congress enacted the 
fourth temporary emergency extension in January 1975, Federal Sup 
plemental Benefits (FSB), which provided up to 13 additional weeks of 
benefits to those who exhausted regular benefits and EB.
In March 1975, the FSB program was extended and made more gen 
erous by providing yet another 13 weeks of benefits. As a result of this 
and further extensions of FSB, a claimant could receive up to 65 weeks 
of unemployment benefits for the period March 1975 through March 
1977: 26 weeks of regular state benefits, 13 weeks of EB, and 26 
weeks of FSB.
In April 1977, FSB was extended again (through January 1978), but 
the potential duration of benefits was reduced to 13 weeks from May 
1977 through the end of the program. This extension also added special 
federal disqualifications for refusal of suitable work and for failure to
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actively seek work, defined suitable work for the FSB program, and 
added special penalty and repayment provisions for fraudulent acts on 
the part of both claimants and employers. This was the first time such 
disqualifications had been imposed as part of a temporary emergency 
extension.
In 1980 and 1981, Congress passed three changes that made it more 
difficult for the EB program to activate. First, the trigger that had acti 
vated EB nationally was eliminated. Second, the IUR needed to acti 
vate EB on a state-specific basis was increased. Third, the definition of 
insured unemployment was revised so as to omit EB claimants from 
the computation, reducing the IUR in times when EB was activated. In 
addition, more stringent eligibility and disqualifying conditions were 
imposed on EB claimants. All of these changes reflected a changed 
attitude toward extended benefits, one that reflected the intent of the 
new Reagan administration and Congress to reduce domestic pro 
grams. Corson and Nicholson's analysis (1985) concluded that the 
1981-1982 changes in EB "had the effect of significantly reducing its 
overall size" (p. vii). Subsequent events suggest a stronger conclu 
sion—that the changes virtually disabled the program.
Nevertheless, the parade of emergency unemployment benefit exten 
sions continued in response to later recessions. In 1982, Congress 
enacted Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) as part of the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. FSC was different from 
previous emergency extended benefit programs in that the number of 
weeks payable in each state varied according to different criteria at dif 
ferent times. In fact, FSC went through four "phases," each of which 
provided different potential benefit durations for each state depending 
on the state's labor market conditions (see table 6.7, under "potential 
duration of extended benefits provided"). Under phase II, a UI claimant 
in a high unemployment state could be eligible for up to 55 weeks of 
benefits: 26 from the regular state program, 13 from EB (assuming the 
state had triggered on), and 16 from FSC.
Potential durations were somewhat shorter under phases III and IV 
of FSC, but the interstate differences in potential benefit durations 
were retained. Under FSC, then, there was more tinkering (or, more 
charitably, greater effort to fine-tune the program) than under previous 
emergency extensions in two senses. First, the idea that emergency 
extensions should provide different potential benefit durations to dif-
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ferent states was wholly new. Second, the various phases of FSC led to 
frequent changes in potential benefit duration and created administra 
tive difficulties for the states. Both of these aspects of FSC began to 
call into question the role of emergency extensions and seemed to be 
an admission that the standby EB program was already defunct.
The most recent emergency extension of unemployment benefits, 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC), was enacted in 
November 1991 after months of foot-dragging by the Bush administra 
tion, which had vetoed several earlier emergency extensions. EUC was 
the most complicated emergency benefit extension of all: it went 
through five phases, provided different potential durations across states 
at a given time, and had different potential durations within a state over 
time (see table 6.7 and Storey and Falk 1993). The potential duration of 
benefits within a state could change either because of congressional fiat 
(that is, a movement from one phase to another), or because a state 
changed its classification between high unemployment and low unem 
ployment. By all accounts, EUC was a state UI administrator's night 
mare. In Pennsylvania, for example, the potential duration of benefits 
changed nine times between November 1991, when EUC became 
effective, and February 1994, when phase V of EUC terminated. Five 
of these changes resulted from enactment of EUC or a movement from 
one phase to another, and four resulted because Pennsylvania was 
reclassified from low unemployment to high unemployment or vice 
versa. At one point, Congress let EUC lapse, but subsequently resusci 
tated it, and during the hiatus, state administrators and UI claimants 
were left hanging.
Activating Extended Benefits
We have already treated the rationale for limiting potential duration, 
the experience of exhaustees, the work disincentives of extending the 
potential duration of benefits, and the idea of optimal UI. These issues 
are important to the potential duration of regular and extended benefits 
alike. However, three issues are specific to extending benefits during a 
recession: how extended benefits should be activated, whether addi 
tional qualifying and eligibility conditions should be required for 
extended benefits, and how extended benefits should be financed. We
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discuss extended benefit triggers first and then turn to the latter two 
issues.
Activating Extended Benefits: National and State-Level Triggers
When the EB program began, extended benefits could be activated 
either nationally or on a state-specific basis. The national "trigger" 
activated the program in all states whenever the seasonally adjusted 
national IUR reached 4.5 percent for 13 weeks. The state-specific trig 
ger activated the program in a state whenever a state's IUR reached 4 
percent for 13 consecutive weeks and was at least 20 percent above the 
average state IUR of the corresponding 13-week period in either of the 
two previous years.
As shown in table 6.7 (see notes to Extended Unemployment Com 
pensation Act of 1970), in 1980 and 1981, the national trigger was 
eliminated and the state-level trigger was raised from an IUR of 4 per 
cent to 5 percent. In addition, the definition of the IUR was revised to 
exclude workers receiving extended and supplemental benefits, lower 
ing the IUR. These changes made it less likely that EB would be acti 
vated in a recession. Combined with secularly falling insured 
unemployment rates, resulting mainly from decreased participation in 
UI, 15 the changes of 1981 led to a situation in which EB was nearly 
defunct by the time of the recession of the early 1990s. In fact, EB was 
activated in only 10 states during that recession and failed to be acti 
vated in several states where many observers felt labor market condi 
tions were bad enough to warrant it. 16
The decreasing availability of EB during recessions would seem to 
have been exactly the outcome desired by Congress in the early 1980s. 
However, in response to the failure of EB to be activated widely during 
the early 1990s recession, a later Congress passed legislation in July 
1992 (and effective June 1993) allowing states to adopt an alternative 
trigger based on the total unemployment rate (TUR), that is, the con 
ventionally defined unemployment rate estimated monthly by the Cur 
rent Population Survey. The alternative trigger activates EB in a state if 
the state's three-month average TUR exceeds 6.5 percent and is 10 per 
cent above the three-month average TUR in either of the two preceding 
years.
It is clear that, during the recession of the early 1990s, the alterna 
tive TUR trigger would have activated EB in many more states than did
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the old IUR trigger (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensa 
tion 1994, chapter 6). The old trigger activated EB in ten states for an 
average of 6.2 months, resulting in benefit payments of $.9 billion. If 
the alternative TUR trigger had been in effect in all states throughout 
the recession, EB would have been activated in forty-three states for an 
average of 18.4 months, resulting in benefit payments of $11.8 bil 
lion. 17 Hence, nationwide adoption of the alternative TUR trigger 
would largely solve the problem of EB becoming defunct.
However, only seven states have adopted the alternative TUR trig 
ger, and all did so shortly after the legislation was enacted. No addi 
tional state has since switched to the new TUR trigger. This suggests 
that the states are unwilling to take on the burden of funding even par 
tially the second-tier or standby extended benefit program. Rather, they 
would prefer to rely entirely on temporary emergency extensions, 
wholly financed by the federal government.
During congressional debate on whether to extend the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation program in 1992 and 1993, Republi 
cans in Congress argued that if Congress continued its pattern of enact 
ing emergency extensions whenever the economy went into recession, 
there would be no incentive for the states to switch to the new alterna 
tive EB trigger (that is, the trigger that is based on the TUR). Indeed, 
states have stalled in adopting the new TUR trigger because they do not 
really want EB to be activated in a recession. The old IUR trigger has 
become ineffective and rarely activates EB, whereas the alternative 
TUR trigger would be more effective. States, however, naturally prefer 
to have the federal government step in and provide emergency 
extended benefits, since emergency benefits have been financed wholly 
by the federal government. In contrast, only half of EB payments are 
financed by the federal government; the other half is financed out of 
states UI trust fund accounts. As long as the states can argue that EB is 
not providing adequate benefit durations, they can reasonably urge 
Congress to enact emergency extensions. Furthermore, as long as Con 
gress accommodates the states with emergency extensions, the states 
have no incentive to switch to the alternative TUR trigger, which would 
be more effective but would also result in greater benefit payments 
from state UI trust funds.
A cynic might argue that Congress really does not want the standby 
EB program to work effectively, either—that members would prefer to
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step in and enact an emergency program whenever the economy 
slumps. An emergency program shows that Congress has "done some 
thing" in an economic downturn and offers the politicians a concrete 
program to point to when they stand for reelection. Such a cynical view 
may not be wholly unrealistic: the alternative TUR trigger would acti 
vate extended benefits in a recession (unlike the IUR trigger), and Con 
gress could require the states to switch to the alternative TUR trigger. 
However, Congress has not done so. 18
Activating Extended Benefits: Substate Triggers
An additional issue that has been considered repeatedly in Congress 
is substate triggers, that is, allowing EB to be activated in a depressed 
local area within a state, rather than requiring that EB be activated 
throughout a state when conditions in the entire state are severe 
enough. The logic underlying this notion is that, from the standpoint of 
labor markets, state boundaries may be quite arbitrary. There may be 
large differences in labor market conditions between urban areas 
within states (consider, for example, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, or 
Los Angeles and San Francisco) or between the urban and rural parts 
of a state. Isn't it unfair to deny extended benefits to unemployed work 
ers who live in a region that is experiencing high unemployment sim 
ply because they happen to live in a state where—overall—the 
unemployment rate is too low for the EB program to be activated? 
Wouldn't substate triggers allow more effective targeting of benefits to 
workers who are having real difficulty finding reemployment?
The arguments against adopting substate EB triggers are many and 
include considerations of administration, equity, and unavailability of 
appropriate data, as well as concerns about whether such a program 
would meet its intended goals (Czajka, Long, and Nicholson 1989; 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1994, chapter 6). 
A major administrative stumbling block would be defining appropriate 
areas within states. Bills proposing the use of substate area triggers 
have provided a variety of regional definitions, including areas desig 
nated by the Secretary of Labor as contiguous population centers of at 
least 250,000, of at least 50,000, any county or equivalent of a county, 
any area designated as a Service Delivery Area under the Job Training 
Partnership Act, and any area designated as an economic area by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis in the Department of Commerce. 19 As a
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geographical unit for activating EB, it is unclear whether any such 
local area would be less arbitrary than the state. Also, it is unclear 
whether individuals would be assigned to an area based on place of 
work or on place of residence. Whatever definitions of substate regions 
were adopted, it is clear that the potential for fraud would be greater 
and that it would be more difficult and costly to determine eligibility 
and process interstate (and interarea) claims. All of these issues raise 
concerns about the equity of substate triggers, since triggering EB in 
local areas could make it more likely that similar individuals facing 
similar labor market conditions and living near each other would 
receive different EB entitlements.
Another major problem in implementing substate triggers would be 
obtaining data for the substate triggers themselves. Accurate indicators 
of labor market conditions in each local area of the country are simply 
unavailable at present. The accuracy of substate TUR estimates is 
highly suspect. Data on employment levels are available only in 250 
metropolitan areas and would need to be developed for places outside 
those areas. Developing either the TUR or local area employment sta 
tistics so that they could be used as an EB trigger would be difficult and 
costly.
Finally, in the most complete study of substate triggers, Czajka, 
Long, and Nicholson (1989) conclude that, although a substate pro 
gram could be designed so as to improve the targeting of UI benefits to 
workers in slack labor markets during nonrecessionary times, the 
potential improvement in targeting during a recession is small. In other 
words, most of the increased benefit payments under a program of sub- 
state triggers would be made during nonrecessionary times, and the 
basic goal of a substate program, improved access to extended benefits 
during a recession, would not be achieved.
State boundaries have long been accepted for triggering extended 
benefit programs because the state has always been the basic opera 
tional unit for UI. Serious unemployment in local areas is clearly an 
appropriate concern of state and local governments, but it is more 
appropriately addressed through local economic development pro 
grams, or perhaps through individual state experiments with UI, than 
by means of the EB program (which has a significant federal compo 
nent). Also, as discussed, the existing standby EB program no longer 
responds even to statewide unemployment problems because the old
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1UR trigger no longer activates the program and states have dragged 
their feet in adopting the new TUR triggers. Fixing the existing EB 
program is clearly a more urgent priority of federal UI policy than try 
ing to fine-tune the program to deal with the problems of localities.
Conclusions on Extended Benefit Triggers
The future of the EB program and emergency extensions is quite 
unclear at this time. Congress seems to pay attention to the UI system 
only when there is a recession, so the role of politics would seem to be 
more important than the role of economic (or any) analysis in deter 
mining the future of extended benefits. It needs to be noted that rela 
tively little effort has been devoted to understanding what is (or would 
be) the socially optimal potential duration of benefits or to analyzing 
the extent to which the optimal potential duration should change with 
changing labor market conditions. These gaps, convincingly addressed, 
could have an impact on policy and on the future direction of extended 
unemployment benefits. Notwithstanding the gaps in our understand 
ing of the optimal potential duration of benefits, we develop two sets of 
recommendations for extended benefit policy in the last part of this 
section.
Further Issues in Extended Benefits
Qualifying and Eligibility Requirements for Extended Benefits
In addition to making it more difficult for EB to trigger on, the 1980 
and 1981 amendments to the standby EB program made eligibility for 
EB more restrictive. Whereas originally, all UI exhaustees were eligi 
ble for available extended benefits, the program now requires that 
workers have at least 20 weeks of work (or the equivalent) in the base 
period to qualify for EB.
The 1980 and 1981 amendments also require EB claimants to 
actively search for work and require the disqualification of EB claim 
ants who failed to accept or apply for suitable work or training to 
which they were referred by the state Employment Service. This dis 
qualification is for the duration of unemployment. 20
The prevailing motivation behind the amendments was to reduce the 
size of the program, and the appeal for their enactment was made 
largely on that basis. It was also argued that the claimants affected
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were long-term unemployed persons lacking in initiative and hence 
less deserving of extended benefits (Rubin 1983, p. 115).
What are the merits of increasing the eligibility requirements for EB 
and of requiring EB claimants to satisfy the work search test? The 
research on benefit adequacy and optimal UI outlined in the second 
section of this chapter offers support for providing EB to all workers 
who exhaust regular UI when EB is in effect. Three arguments do favor 
setting more stringent eligibility requirements for extended benefits 
than for regular benefits, although their merits are debatable. The first 
is that individuals who have worked longer (and whose employers have 
contributed more) should have greater entitlement to benefits. Second, 
setting more stringent eligibility requirements for EB than for regular 
benefits reduces the financial cost of EB. Third, more stringent eligibil 
ity requirements for EB may limit the moral hazard of EB. For this 
third argument to be persuasive, there would need to be evidence that 
the work disincentive of an additional week of EB is greater for some 
workers—those who appear to be less strongly attached to the labor 
force—than for others. We are unaware of any such evidence, however.
Requiring EB claimants to satisfy a more stringent (and uniform) 
federal work search test makes little sense if indeed there are few job 
vacancies during periods when EB is activated. State UI administrators 
and employers alike would prefer to waive the work search test for EB 
in regions where it is clear that job vacancies are scarce. Imposing the 
work search test in such regions has little value and is costly to both 
administrators (who are expected to enforce the requirement) and to 
employers (who may get job inquiries from claimants who are merely 
trying to satisfy the work test without any serious hope of gaining 
reemployment). These findings are reflected in one of the recommen 
dations of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, 
which suggested that "Each state should be allowed to determine an 
appropriate work search test, based on the conditions of its labor mar 
ket" (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1994, p. 12).
Financing Extended Benefits21
There are three main issues in financing extended benefits: first, 
whether extended benefits should be funded out of payroll taxes (as are 
regular benefits) or from federal general revenues; second, whether 
extended benefits should be financed by the states, by the federal gov-
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ernment, or by some combination of the two; and third, if EB is funded 
from a payroll tax, whether that payroll tax should be experience rated 
(as it is for regular benefits). A complete treatment of these issues 
would require a more detailed discussion of UI financing than is appro 
priate in this chapter. Briefly, though, regular benefits are funded fully 
by the states through a payroll tax that is experience rated (that is, 
dependent on each employer's past layoff experience) and collected on 
a taxable payroll limited to less than $15,000 a year (per worker) in all 
but eleven states. 22 This method of financing UI benefits creates eco 
nomic incentives for firms to behave in ways that they otherwise would 
not. First, experience rating of the payroll tax reduces temporary lay 
offs and limits the extent to which employers in seasonal and cyclically 
sensitive industries are subsidized by employers in more stable indus 
tries (see Brechling and Laurence 1995, Levine's chapter 8 in this vol 
ume, and Topel 1990 for discussions and further references). Second, 
the cap on taxable payroll skews employers' demand for labor away 
from low-wage, less skilled workers and in favor of high-wage, more 
skilled workers. Also, the payroll tax cap creates an incentive for 
employers to assign extra hours of work (that is, overtime) to their 
existing work force rather than to hire additional workers.
Whether extended benefits should be funded by a payroll tax or by 
general revenues depends mainly on issues of tax equity. The available 
evidence suggests that the UI payroll tax is shifted partly to workers in 
the form of lower wages and partly to consumers in the form of higher 
prices. The part that is shifted to workers can be viewed as regressive, 
since low-wage workers bear a disproportionate share of the payroll 
tax as a result of the low taxable wage base. (This regressiveness would 
be blunted if low-wage workers received a disproportionate share of 
the benefits, which seems likely.) The part that is shifted to consumers 
can be viewed as proportionate if we assume that people with different 
incomes consume a mix of goods and services on which average UI 
taxes do not differ. On balance, then, the UI payroll tax is probably 
somewhat regressive (Hamermesh 1977, pp. 10-15). Federal general 
revenues, on the other hand, are somewhat progressive, given that 
(apart from social security payroll taxes) over 70 percent of those reve 
nues are generated by the federal personal income tax. Tax equity, 
then, gives a slight edge to general revenues over payroll taxes as a 
funding source for extended benefits.
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However, the overall question of tax equity ignores the issue of 
state-federal sharing of extended benefit expenses: should extended 
benefit payments that are made in a state be paid for by that state, by 
the federal government, or by some combination of the two? Currently, 
half the benefits under the EB program are paid out of the Extended 
Unemployment Compensation Account, which is funded from FUTA 
revenues (that is, the flat 0.8 percent of taxable payroll that the federal 
government charges for administration, extended benefits, and repay 
able advances). State UI trust fund reserves pay for the other half. Most 
emergency extensions, however, have been financed entirely from fed 
eral revenues, either from the EUCA or (increasingly) from general 
revenues (see table 6.7).
The existing state-federal sharing of EB funding appears to have 
wide acceptance and is based on the rationale that long-term unem 
ployment is likely to be the result of macroeconomic conditions (both 
national and international) over which individual employers have little 
or no control (Murray 1974, chapter 5). Federal sharing of EB 
expenses, then, is a way of providing some assistance to states that are 
suffering disproportionately from long-term unemployment. 23 In addi 
tion, federal sharing has been seen as a way of reducing the resistance 
of states (and employers) to extended benefits. Although there appears 
to be no comprehensive economic analysis of the costs and benefits of 
federal sharing of EB funding, the arguments seem to favor the federal 
government assuming more, rather than less, of the funding burden for 
extended benefits.
There is no empirical evidence on whether experience rating of ben 
efits paid under EB has the beneficial effects that have been estimated 
for experience rating of the regular program. 24 Obtaining such evidence 
would be difficult, given that the EB tax is such a small percentage of 
the overall UI tax. However, it seems likely that increasing the experi 
ence rating of EB would be far less beneficial than would increasing 
the experience rating of regular benefits. The main reason is that, 
although employers do have considerable discretion over the timing 
and incidence of temporary layoffs, they may have much less discre 
tion over the incidence of permanent job losses, which often lead to 
long-term unemployment. Also, it has been argued that spells of unem 
ployment that last beyond 26 weeks result more from general macro- 
economic conditions than from the actions of a specific employer. As a
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result, there seems to be less scope for experience rating to have a pos 
itive effect in the case of EB than in the regular UI program, and less 
justification for its use in financing EB.
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994, pp. 
11-12) recommended that any expansion of extended benefits be 
financed by raising the taxable wage base under the federal UI payroll 
tax (FUTA) from $7,000 to $8,500. 25 The Advisory Council believed 
that the two most attractive funding sources for EB are federal general 
revenues and FUTA, which is neither state-specific nor experience 
rated. Because the taxes that produce federal general revenues may be 
somewhat more progressive than the federal UI payroll tax, federal 
general revenues may have an advantage. However, the Advisory 
Council opted for reducing the regressiveness of the UI payroll tax by 
recommending an increase in the taxable wage base. 26 In any event, the 
Advisory Council believed the case for funding extended benefits out 
of an experience-rated payroll tax to be weak. 27
Recommended Changes in the Extended Benefit Programs
The previous discussion suggests two recommendations for changes 
in extended UI benefit policy. First, repair the EB triggers. It is impor 
tant that the standby EB program be made effective, so that the poten 
tial duration of benefits is lengthened in a timely manner when a 
recession hits. The importance of repairing the standby EB program 
follows from the available evidence that long spells of unemployment 
are underinsured and that the potential duration of regular state benefits 
may be suboptimal. Congress effectively disabled the triggers that acti 
vate EB in the early 1980s. Since then the program has often failed to 
be activated automatically in states that are experiencing slack labor 
markets during a recession. As a result, Congress has stepped in with 
increasingly complicated emergency programs that have significantly 
lagged the onset of recession, have been ad hoc in design, and have 
been difficult to administer. Compared with a well-designed standby 
EB program, these emergency programs have been far less effective in 
providing countercyclical stimulus and have been slower to provide 
benefits to unemployed workers.
Several recommendations have been advanced for repairing the trig 
gers that activate the standby EB program. For example, a majority of
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members of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
recommended that EB should be activated when a state's seasonally 
adjusted TUR exceeds 6.5 percent (Advisory Council on Unemploy 
ment Compensation 1994, p. 10). Similarly, as discussed, it is clear that 
several Republican members of Congress see adoption of the alterna 
tive TUR trigger by all states as the way to fix the problem. 28 Which of 
these recommendations is adopted is less important than ensuring that 
one of them is adopted. The EB program, which could be an effective, 
efficient, and socially useful program, is now all but a dead letter. 29
Second, design a third-tier temporary emergency program in 
advance of the next recession and have it ready to implement when and 
if Congress perceives that the standby EB program is not providing 
long-enough benefit durations. Creating a model third-tier emergency 
program that can be put into effect at the discretion of Congress is 
important as a practical matter, since Congress has shown repeatedly a 
penchant for passing emergency extended benefit programs (at least 
after a delay) when the economy sinks into a recession—and did so 
even when the standby EB program was activated in most states that 
were experiencing slack labor markets (that is, during the recessions of 
the mid-1970s and early 1980s). Having an emergency program 
designed in advance would give the states time to set up the computer 
ized information systems that are needed to implement the program 
quickly and to administer it effectively. Ultimately, the administrative 
costs of a well-designed emergency program would be lower than the 
costs of repeated ad hoc programs, and workers would be better served 
because benefits would be received in a timely manner. In other words, 
the net social benefits of a predesigned emergency extended benefit 
program would be far greater than the benefits of a program that has an 
ad hoc design and needs to be implemented on the fly. 30
How should a ready-to-implement third-tier program be designed? 
We believe that there are three essential elements to such a program, 
which might be called the Federal Emergency Extended Benefits pro 
gram. First, provide federal emergency benefits only in states in which 
the standby EB program has been activated, and only to workers who 
have exhausted both their regular and standby extended benefits. There 
are two main reasons for this feature of a federal emergency program. 
First, it would direct extended benefits to workers who face the most 
difficulty obtaining reemployment. Second, it would ensure that the
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standby EB program is taken seriously, that is, that effective EB trig 
gers are established and maintained. Relatedly, it would create an 
incentive for states to adopt the alternative TUR trigger for EB (if it 
were not mandated by Congress), since federal funding for emergency 
benefits would be received only if EB were in effect. By ensuring the 
maintenance of an effective EB program, paying federal emergency 
benefits only to EB exhaustees would eliminate the need to implement 
"reach-backs" as part of emergency extensions. 31 If Congress preferred 
to provide extended benefits to all states in a recession, it would be 
appropriate first to reestablish the national trigger for the EB program. 
Consideration could then be given to providing federal emergency ben 
efits to all states based on a similar national trigger for the federal 
emergency program.
Second, finance federal emergency benefits wholly out of federal 
revenues, either from FUTA funds or from general revenues. Federal 
funding of emergency extended benefits is in keeping with the widely 
accepted notion that increasingly long spells of unemployment, espe 
cially when induced by a recession, are more and more a federal 
responsibility (Murray 1974). 32
Third, incorporate some bounded flexibility in the number of addi 
tional weeks of benefits provided by the federal emergency extended 
benefit program. Starting with the Federal Supplemental Benefits pro 
gram (1975-1978), Congress has provided additional weeks of benefits 
in relation to the unemployment rate in a state. For example, under the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program (1991- 
1994), each state was classified as either "high unemployment" or "low 
unemployment" based on its total unemployment rate. The number of 
weeks of emergency benefits provided in each state was then tied to the 
state's classification as "low" or "high" unemployment. Similarly, a 
ready-to-implement federal emergency program should provide for 
longer benefit extensions in states where conditions are worse. How 
ever, it is essential that there be flexibility in the number of weeks of 
benefits provided and in the unemployment rate that triggers each 
increment to extended benefits each time the program is enacted or 
reenacted. This would allow Congress to take account of current condi 
tions and of changes in the relationship between UI exhaustions and 
the unemployment rate. Also, Congress would retain the sort of discre 
tion it clearly prefers in fashioning extended benefit programs. 33
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Nevertheless, Congress should place two types of bounds on its flex 
ibility in providing federal emergency benefits. First, for the purpose of 
determining how many weeks of these benefits to offer, states should 
be classified into at most two or three categories based on their total 
(quarterly) unemployment rate. For example, under EUC, states were 
classified as either high or low unemployment. Two or three categories 
should be enough, particularly if emergency extended benefits are pro 
vided in increments of eight or more weeks, as Corson, Grossman, and 
Nicholson (1986) suggest in their study of Federal Supplemental Com 
pensation. Second, a state's assignment to a high or low unemployment 
classification should be on the basis of a calendar quarter, and Con 
gress should not allow itself to change the number of weeks of emer 
gency benefits provided to states in a given classification within a 
calendar quarter. In other words, it should be impossible to change the 
number of weeks of emergency benefits provided in a given state dur 
ing a current calendar quarter. This recommendation is consistent with 
the findings of Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986), who consid 
ered both administrative feasibility and program effectiveness in their 
research.
A fourth issue, the requirements that a worker would have to satisfy 
in order to be eligible for federal emergency extended benefits, would 
also need to be settled. We have no recommendation on this point. 
Since 1981, the eligibility requirements for standby EB have been set 
at the national level. In about 15 states, the eligibility requirements for 
EB are significantly more stringent than for regular state benefits, and, 
as a result, significantly fewer workers are eligible for EB than for reg 
ular state benefits. The available empirical evidence suggests that there 
is only a weak relationship between the characteristics that determine 
UI eligibility and a worker's expected duration of unemployment (Cor 
son and Nicholson 1982, pp. 102-106; Pozo and Woodbury 1988). That 
is, using tighter eligibility requirements for EB than for regular state 
benefits reduces program expenses but does not screen out and deny 
benefits to workers who are weakly attached to the labor force. This 
supports dropping the uniform federal eligibility requirements for EB 
(and for any ready-to-implement federal emergency program) and 
allowing each state to set the eligibility requirements for all forms of 
UI benefits, first-, second-, and third-tier. On the other hand, an argu 
ment could be made that if federal revenues finance a program, the
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associated eligibility requirements should be set at the federal level. 
These arguments for and against setting eligibility requirements for EB 
and emergency benefits on a national basis would need to be weighed 
in fashioning a Federal Emergency Extended Benefits program.
The preceding recommendations for a ready-to-implement emer 
gency extended benefit program are not intended merely to make the 
lives of UI administrators easier—although they would do that. Rather, 
such a program would result in more timely payment of emergency 
benefits to workers and would provide greater counter cyclical stimu 
lus than past emergency extended benefit programs have done.
Some Provisional Conclusions
The adequacy of UI benefit duration has been debated since the 
beginning of the system, and the accepted norm for the potential dura 
tion of benefits, as expressed in policy, has changed significantly over 
the decades. When the program began in 1935, most states provided a 
maximum potential duration of 15 weeks of benefits. This norm gradu 
ally rose, until by 1979, the maximum potential duration of benefits 
was 26 weeks in most states and exceeded 26 weeks in twelve states. 
Augmenting this upward trend were the standby EB program, which 
came into existence in 1970, and a parade of temporary emergency 
benefit extensions. Both EB and the emergency extensions provided 
additional weeks of benefits during hard times. During the 1980s, the 
trend reversed, so that today, the maximum potential duration of regu 
lar state benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states. Also, in 1981 and 
1982, Congress effectively scaled back the EB program. Whether this 
trend will continue or again reverse itself is to be seen. Pushing toward 
longer benefit durations are increasing concerns over dislocated work 
ers and job insecurity; pushing toward shorter durations is the political 
obsession with reducing government programs without regard to social 
costs or benefits.
It seems fair to say that, as with other government programs, 
research and analysis have played a regrettably limited role in setting 
and changing the duration of UI benefits. There has, of course, been 
significant work on the disincentive effects of extended benefits (see
272 The Duration of Benefits
the summary in table 6.6), and the U.S. Department of Labor has com 
missioned evaluations of the three most recent emergency extended 
benefit programs (Corson and Nicholson 1982; Corson, Grossman, and 
Nicholson 1986). However, it is also clear that the research thus far has 
not fully addressed some of the major issues that need to be investi 
gated in forming policy on the duration of benefits, such as the optimal 
duration of benefits, how duration should change over the business 
cycle, and the merits of EB triggers other than the IUR and TUR. 
Whether further research along the lines described in the second sec 
tion of this chapter will converge on a convincing and clear set of rec 
ommendations is yet to be seen, but the work that has been completed 
to date suggests that the current focus of the UI system on compensat 
ing only relatively short spells of unemployment may be unnecessarily 
narrow.
The findings that suggest this conclusion can be summarized as fol 
lows. First, the UI program in the United States was defined as a pro 
gram for short-term unemployment mainly out of financial and 
political expediency, rather than after consideration of whether perma 
nent job loss and long-term unemployment are insurable risks. The 
financial argument against covering longer spells of unemployment is 
not nearly as persuasive today as it was in the 1930s.
Second, existing studies suggest that increasing the potential dura 
tion of UI benefits by one week increases the expected duration of 
unemployment by one day (0.2 week) or less. This is a relatively small 
behavioral effect that suggests that the average UI recipient is not abus 
ing or taking advantage of the availability of benefits (although a siz 
able minority of UI recipients could be doing so).
Third, work on consumption-smoothing and benefit adequacy sug 
gests that short spells of unemployment are overcompensated by the UI 
system, whereas long spells are undercompensated. Also, research on 
optimal duration of benefits suggests that risk averse workers would 
willingly accept lower benefits early in a spell of unemployment in 
exchange for the promise of some nonzero level of benefits should 
their spell of unemployment turn out to be very long. It follows that 
reducing benefits to short-term unemployed workers (for example, 
through increasing the waiting period) in order to finance benefits to 
long-term unemployed workers would improve social welfare. Thus, 
considerations of consumption smoothing, benefit adequacy, and opti-
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mal insurance all suggest that it would be reasonable public policy to 
extend the potential duration of benefits beyond 26 weeks, perhaps 
even during nonrecessionary times.
These three findings apply equally to regular and extended benefits, 
in that they address the issue of potential duration in general. All three 
considerations suggest that the existing UI system has focused too nar 
rowly on short spells of unemployment and that policy should pay 
greater attention to long-term unemployment. In fact, U.S. Department 
of Labor policy has recently moved in this direction. The UI profiling 
initiative is an attempt to identify new UI claimants who are likely to 
experience a long spell of unemployment and to exhaust their benefits. 
These claimants are then referred to intensive job search assistance. An 
alternative response would be to extend the waiting period by one or 
two weeks and to use the financial savings to fund a longer potential 
duration of regular state benefits.
Apart from setting the maximum potential duration of benefits, per 
haps the most important general issue in the duration of benefits is 
whether potential duration should be the same for all workers who are 
eligible for benefits, or whether potential duration should vary with a 
worker's earnings prior to unemployment. This is a point that is 
equally significant to the regular and extended benefit programs. In the 
regular state program, the question is whether benefit duration should 
be uniform (in which case all workers who qualify for any benefits are 
eligible for the same potential duration) or variable (in which case 
recipients with different work histories are eligible for different poten 
tial durations). In extended benefit programs, the question is whether 
eligibility requirements should be higher for extended benefits than for 
regular benefits.
The research on benefit adequacy and optimal UI outlined in the 
second section of this chapter provides a justification for uniform 
potential duration of benefits to all eligible UI claimants and for provi 
sion of extended benefits (when such a program is in effect) to all 
workers who exhaust regular UI. In addition, it is clear that uniform 
duration in regular state programs results in a significant increase in the 
average potential duration of benefits in a state, which in turn reduces 
the UI exhaustion rate. The evidence suggests that the decline in aver 
age potential duration is at least partly responsible for the secular rise
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in UI exhaustions and that moves toward uniform duration would help 
to reverse the trend.
However, there are at least three arguments for varying the potential 
duration of benefits with a claimant's work history and, by implication, 
for setting more stringent eligibility requirements for extended benefits 
than for regular benefits. The first is that greater entitlement should be 
afforded to those who have worked (and whose employers have con 
tributed) the longest. The counterargument is that weekly benefit 
amounts already reflect work history, so why should potential duration 
do so as well? The second argument is that variable duration and more 
stringent eligibility requirements for extended benefits result in lower 
program costs. Since lower program costs would, in this case, mean 
lower program benefits, this is hardly a persuasive argument. It begs 
the question whether lowering benefits can be justified by efficiency or 
equity criteria. A third argument in favor of variable potential duration 
of benefits and more stringent eligibility requirements for extended 
benefits is that they are ways of limiting the moral hazard of UI. In 
general, of course, limiting the duration of benefits is an effort to limit 
moral hazard. But variable duration and more stringent eligibility 
requirements for extended benefits take the further step of assuming 
that the work disincentive of an additional week of benefits is greater 
for some workers, those who appear to be less strongly attached to the 
labor force, than for others. The implicit argument is that it is possible 
to discern which eligible UI claimants are weakly attached to the labor 
force and hence are most likely to reduce their job search effort in 
response to an additional week of benefits. However, we are unaware 
of evidence that base-period earnings (or their pattern) provide an 
accurate measure of a worker's labor force attachment or that the disin 
centive effects of an additional week of benefits are greater for workers 
with lower or more variable base-period earnings. It seems likely that 
moral hazard can be handled more effectively by a work search 
requirement or intensive job search assistance than by limiting the 
potential duration of benefits.
Finally, the potential duration, triggering, and financing of extended 
benefits have been among the most contentious issues in UI during 
much of the program's history. The main rationale for extending UI 
benefits during a recession is that, during a recession, spells of unem 
ployment lengthen and the number of UI beneficiaries who exhaust
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their benefits rises. As long as the lengthened spells result from slack 
demand and employer behavior (rather than being a result of voluntary 
worker behavior), there is a justification for increasing the potential 
duration of UI benefits. In fact, the evidence suggests that UI exhaust- 
ees are much less likely to find reemployment during recessionary 
times than during nonrecessionary times (see table 6.5), which tends to 
support the traditional rationale for extending benefits during a reces 
sion.
Work on the adequacy of extended benefits has relied primarily on 
the total UI exhaustion rate as a criterion for gauging duration ade 
quacy. However, the exhaustion rate is an ad hoc criterion, since we 
really do not know what the "right" exhaustion rate is. Similarly, 
research on the merits of various "triggers" for extended benefits has 
been limited to comparing the amounts of benefits that would be paid 
under various triggers, without developing a normative framework that 
would provide real guidance as to which triggering mechanism would 
be optimal. In other words, although there has been much research on 
extended benefits—useful and competently done—the work has been 
developed without the sort of economic framework that would give 
convincing answers to some of the most pressing policy questions on 
extended benefits: What is the optimal potential duration of extended 
benefits? To what extent should potential benefit duration vary with 
changing labor market conditions? What are the best criteria for acti 
vating (and de-activating) extended benefits? What are the appropriate 
mechanisms for financing extended benefits?
Nevertheless, based on the existing research, as well as on prag 
matic considerations, we offer two recommendations for extended ben 
efit policy. First, we strongly recommend that the triggers for the 
standby EB program be repaired, so that the program will again be 
effective and the potential duration of benefits will be lengthened in a 
timely manner when the next recession hits. Second, and equally 
strongly, we recommend creation of a Federal Emergency Extended 
Benefits program in advance of the next recession. Such a program 
would be ready to implement when and if Congress perceived that the 
standby EB program is not providing sufficient benefit durations. A 
Federal Emergency Extended Benefits program would have three 
essential characteristics: it would provide federal emergency benefits 
only in states in which the standby EB program has been activated, and
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only to workers who have exhausted both their regular and standby 
extended benefits; it would be financed out of federal revenues; and it 
would give bounded flexibility in the number of additional weeks of 
emergency benefits provided. Compared with past emergency 
extended benefit programs, such a program would be easier and less 
costly to administer, result in more timely payment of emergency ben 
efits to workers, and offer greater countercyclical stimulus.
NOTES
For helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts, we are grateful to Laune J Bassi, Carl 
Davidson, Louis S Jacobson, Peter Kuhn, Robert Pavosevich, Wayne Vroman, and Stephen A 
Wandner Rich Deibel, Ellen Maloney, and Claire Black assisted in preparing the manuscript.
1 See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p 129) for a discussion of 
replacement rates based on the administrative records of six states. Although the ACUC discus 
sion is based on a different definition of the replacement rate (the ratio of weekly benefits to aver 
age base-period earnings) than the one used in the text, it does suggest that benefit durations in 
excess of base-period employment durations would imply strong work disincentives
2 In addition, the waiting period serves the same function as a deductible in a standard insur 
ance contract Hence, it prevents very small claims (that is, short spells of unemployment) from 
being compensated and provides a mechanism for risk-sharing See Davidson and Woodbury 
(1997) and the literature cited there, especially Raviv (1979) and Shavell and Weiss (1979)
3 The amendments were part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980 (P L. 96- 
499, approved December 5, 1980). See also Rubm (1983, pp 109-111)
4 See U S. Department of Labor (1995, Section 315)
5 The UI payroll tax has been used as a vehicle to finance innovative programs (such as work 
place-based training) for workers affected by structural change For a review of these programs, 
see Leigh (1990)
6. The source for this and the next two paragraphs is U.S Department of Labor (1995)
7. Manual of State Employment Security Legislation (1942), Employment Security Memoran 
dum No 13,p 313
8. The regular exhaustion rate is measured as the number of exhaustees in a given month 
divided by the number of initial claims for benefits that were filed six months before This is an 
inexact measure of the exhaustion rate because not all initial claimants who exhaust their benefits 
do so six months later Rather, some exhaust benefits in less than six months—for example, those 
whose potential duration of benefits is less than 26 weeks and who exhaust their benefits after a 
continuous spell of unemployment Other exhaustees take more than six months to exhaust their 
benefits—for example, those who experience more than one spell of insured unemployment dur 
ing the benefit year
9 Given that only one of the four existing studies was performed during a recession, an addi 
tional study that sampled a group of exhaustees during a recession would be useful even if it did 
not continuously sample over a period of time that is long enough to include both tight and slack 
labor markets.
10 Profiling also reflects the view that most dislocated workers are job-ready
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11 Grossman's results (1989) are a glaring exception They differ from any of the other esti 
mates, however, because they are estimates of the impact of an additional week of emergency ben 
efits for workers who have already exhausted their regular benefits.
12 Solving the data problems head-on might prove more satisfactory than econometric solu 
tions to the data problems, there are ways of mitigating the limitation of administrative data, but to 
date these have not been pursued
13 The remainder of this section draws liberally from Davidson and Woodbury (forthcom 
ing).
14. For a more extensive narrative account, see Blaustem (1993, pp. 200-206 and 228-241).
15 On the drop in UI participation rates, see Bassi and McMurrer (in this volume) as well as 
Blank and Card (1991) and Vroman (1991)
16. EB was activated during 1990 in Alaska and Rhode Island During 1991, EB was activated 
(in addition) in Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Vermont, and West Vir 
ginia. In the first quarter of 1992, EB was activated in Louisiana. Notably missing from the list are 
California and northeastern states such as New York and Pennsylvania, all of which experienced a 
severe recession in the early 1990s
17 These estimates are from Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994, 
chapter 6) and are for the period January 1990 through August 1993 For comparison, during the 
same time period the EUC program provided extended benefits in all states for 22 months, result 
ing in benefit payments of $23 billion. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994, 
chapter 6) and Corson and Rangarajan (1994) provide estimated impacts of a variety of alternative 
EB triggers
18 There is, however, a less cynical explanation of why Congress has not required the states 
to adopt the alternative TUR trigger If the EB trigger were effective, EB would be activated in 
some states even during times of low national unemployment, since labor market conditions vary 
substantially across the states So an ineffective EB program yields budget savings for the federal 
government
19 See US House of Representatives (1985), p. 91
20 Congress suspended the disqualification for failure to search for work during 1991 through 
1995, however, the disqualification is now back in effect.
21 This discussion draws on Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994, 
chapter 6)
22. Of the eleven states that have a payroll tax base exceeding $15,000, only one (New Jersey) 
is among the ten largest states See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996, 
table5-l,p 67).
23. If some states specialize in industries that tend to generate long-term unemployment, such 
interstate assistance could turn into interstate subsidies that have efficiency consequences.
24 In 1994, thirty-four states charged some percentage of benefits paid under EB back to the 
employer (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1994, chapter 6)
25 In 1996, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation recommended (with 
some dissent) raising the payroll tax base to $9,000 and adjusting the base annually by the 
Employment Cost Index (Advisory Council Unemployment Compensation 1996, p 19)
26. From a political standpoint, of course, the payroll tax has the distinct advantage that it is 
dedicated to the payment of UI benefits.
27. In contrast to the reasoning of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, 
Brechling and Laurence (1995) have recently offered a theoretical case for funding the costs of 
permanent job loss by taxing employers who permanently reduce their employment. Brechling 
and Laurence argue that a socially optimal rate of adjustment can be obtained by forcing the agent 
who controls the rate of adjustment to pay for the adjustment costs This argument can be
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extended to suggest that EB should be funded by employers who contract and are responsible for 
long-term unemployment. In other words, EB should be funded out of experience-rated payroll 
taxes, not out of general revenues. The debatable point in this argument is whether employers in 
contracting industries really are able to control the rate at which they contract
28. As discussed earlier in this section, the alternative TUR trigger activates EB in a state 
when the state's three-month average TUR exceeds 6.5 percent and is 10 percent above the three- 
month average TUR in either of the two preceding years
29 Once the triggers have been repaired in this basic way, attention could be paid to whether 
greater potential duration of benefits should be activated if the unemployment rate rose signifi 
cantly above 6 5 percent For example, Hight (1975) and Corson and Nicholson (1982, chapter 5) 
investigated how the total UI exhaustion rate could be kept constant by triggering additional bene 
fit extensions with increases in the insured unemployment rate They found that the exhaustion 
rate is held constant by adding about 3.5 to 5.1 weeks to potential duration for each 1 percentage 
point increase in the insured unemployment rate With a TUR trigger, the relationship between 
exhaustion rates and the TUR would need to be investigated
30 See Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986) for a discussion of the administrative diffi 
culties encountered during the Federal Supplemental Compensation program
31. Reach-backs have provided emergency extended benefits to workers who exhausted their 
benefits before adoption of the emergency extension program. For example, under the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation program (1991-1994), most individuals who received reach-back 
EUC benefits had exhausted their regular state benefits between March and November 1991 but 
had never received benefits under the standby EB program With an effective EB program, these 
workers would already have received some weeks of extended benefits, and there would be no 
need for a reach-back
32 However, Brechling and Laurence (1995) have offered quite a different set of recommen 
dations. See note 27
33. Obviously, Congress would have the discretion to ignore any ready-to-implement third- 
tier program and to fashion an entirely new one, as it has done (in effect) in the past However, the 
purpose of creating such a third-tier program is to shorten the time needed to react to a recession 
and to ease and rationalize administration of the program.
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